Kant's Tribunal of Reason: Legal Metaphor and Normativity in the Critique of Pure Reason by Sofie Møller (review)

Abstract

that may have overlapped somewhat with Socianism and Arminianism but owed nothing to either. Locke’s moralist soteriology, along with some of his other Christian beliefs, look like Socinian and Arminian doctrines, admits Lucci. But many of his other beliefs did not, especially, Lucci says, those concerning original sin, satisfaction, and atonement (96–105). This was because Locke’s theological beliefs were formed by neither commitment nor opposition to any particular sect, but rather by his careful, plain, and simple reading of the Gospels (50). Locke had no problem with adopting the views of theologians when their positions were revealed through Scripture, and he had no problem turning away from them when their positions were not. But because Locke was not following any sect in arriving at his own theological positions, it is misleading to label him as a sectarian of any stripe—Locke’s views, in other words, may be like a Socinian’s or an Arminian’s, but he himself was neither, as the basis for his Christian beliefs was independent of both sects. Regarding persons, Lucci foregrounds Locke’s thinking about identity at Judgment Day as a result of his commitment to moral soteriology. According to Lucci, two significant consequences follow from this. First, Locke believed that personal identity resided in the union of mind and body rather than solely in the mind or solely in the body. Second, Locke believed that consciousness was only a necessary condition for moral responsibility (conceptualized as damnation or salvation based on behaviors measured against the law of nature). This, Lucci argues, counters common objections raised by Thiel and Strawson against Locke’s moralist soteriology. Concerning toleration, Lucci foregrounds Locke’s “markedly religious conception of life and morality” (175) and argues that Locke’s was a distinctively Christian form of toleration, pace the common conception of it as an expression of his secularism. The motivating factors for Locke were that Christianity is best seen as the true religion when it outshines alternative forms of salvation in a free and open environment and that acceptance of the law of faith is best when it is freely chosen. This entails that religious forms of life are tolerable so long as they do not undermine people’s commitments to the law of nature. Lucci then discusses how Locke’s exceptions to toleration—Catholics and atheists—run afoul of this moral condition for being tolerable, atheists because they reject any divine lawgiver and Catholics because they are committed to certain immoral principles. Thus, Lucci supports Goldie’s position that Locke found Catholic antinomianism intolerable (and not Catholicism as such) because he found antinomianism to be fundamentally intolerable (190). Lucci not only provides an excellent account of Locke’s Christian beliefs but also shows how those beliefs are relevant for interpreting and understanding some of Locke’s philosophical positions. Lucci’s book will be read and discussed by scholars for years to come. B e n j a m i n H i l l Western University, ON