Better vaguely right than precisely wrong in effective altruism: the problem of marginalism

IF 1.2 2区哲学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-05-30 DOI:10.1017/S0266267122000062

Nicolas Côté, Bastian Steuwer

引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract Effective altruism (EA) requires that when we donate to charity, we maximize the beneficial impact of our donations. While we are in broad sympathy with EA, we raise a practical problem for EA, which is that there is a crucial empirical presupposition implicit in its charity assessment methods which is false in many contexts. This is the presupposition that the magnitude of the benefits (or harms) generated by some charity vary continuously in the scale of the intervention performed. We characterize a wide class of cases where this assumption fails, and then draw out the normative implications of this fact.

查看原文本刊更多论文

在有效的利他主义中，模糊正确总比准确错误好：边缘主义问题

摘要有效利他主义（EA）要求当我们向慈善机构捐款时，我们最大限度地发挥捐款的有益影响。虽然我们对EA有着广泛的同情，但我们提出了EA的一个实际问题，即其慈善评估方法中隐含着一个关键的经验预设，在许多情况下都是错误的。这是一个前提，即一些慈善机构产生的利益（或伤害）的大小在干预的规模中不断变化。我们描述了这一假设失败的一大类情况，然后得出了这一事实的规范含义。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Economics and Philosophy Multiple-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

8.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.