Understanding supplier motivation to engage in multiparty performance-based contracts: The lens of Expectancy theory

IF 6.8 2区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT
Anna Nikulina, Finn Wynstra
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

Research on performance-based contracts (PBCs) has emphasized outcome uncertainty (lack of outcome attributability) as an obstacle to applying such contracts effectively and has investigated possible ways to mitigate this uncertainty. Most studies primarily address dyadic buyer-supplier contracts and the uncertainty that originates in the environment or in buyer behaviour. However, suppliers often also depend on other suppliers and sub-suppliers in the process of outcome creation. Such reciprocal interdependencies between more than two parties cannot easily be addressed through dyadic contracts. This paper examines how effective multiparty PBCs can be designed to align the interests of multiple suppliers. To develop our a priori conceptualisation, we first review the literature and identify the factors that affect suppliers' willingness to engage in PBCs, drawing on Expectancy theory to unravel the motivational effects of rewards. We then use case studies from the construction sector to investigate how these factors apply to multiparty PBCs and identify specific variables that influence supplier motivation in such settings. Based on our findings, we propose that expectancy (the relationship between effort and performance) is enhanced by parties’ joint participation in the planning and control of project activities, their reputation, and specific contractual elements such as the codification of collaboration or reward design in hybrid PBCs. Instrumentality (the link between performance and reward) is primarily affected by the perceived fairness of the reward sharing and codified collaboration, and valence (the relationship between reward and supplier objectives) is mainly influenced by the monetary amounts at stake.

理解供应商参与基于绩效的多方合同的动机:期望理论的视角
对基于绩效的合同(PBCs)的研究强调结果的不确定性(缺乏结果归因性)是有效应用这种合同的障碍,并研究了减轻这种不确定性的可能方法。大多数研究主要涉及二元买方-供应商合同和源于环境或买方行为的不确定性。然而,在产品创造的过程中,供应商往往也依赖于其他供应商和次级供应商。两个以上当事方之间的这种相互依赖关系不容易通过二元合同来解决。本文探讨了如何有效地设计多方PBCs来协调多个供应商的利益。为了发展我们的先验概念,我们首先回顾了文献并确定了影响供应商参与PBCs意愿的因素,利用期望理论来揭示奖励的激励效应。然后,我们使用建筑行业的案例研究来调查这些因素如何适用于多方PBCs,并确定在这种情况下影响供应商动机的具体变量。基于我们的研究结果,我们建议期望(努力与绩效之间的关系)可以通过各方共同参与项目活动的规划和控制、他们的声誉和特定的合同要素(如混合PBCs中的合作或奖励设计的规范化)来增强。工具性(绩效和奖励之间的联系)主要受到奖励分享和规范化合作的感知公平性的影响,而效价(奖励和供应商目标之间的关系)主要受到利害关系的货币数量的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.30
自引率
18.00%
发文量
31
审稿时长
70 days
期刊介绍: The mission of the Journal of Purchasing & Supply Management is to publish original, high-quality research within the field of purchasing and supply management (PSM). Articles should have a significant impact on PSM theory and practice. The Journal ensures that high quality research is collected and disseminated widely to both academics and practitioners, and provides a forum for debate. It covers all subjects relating to the purchase and supply of goods and services in industry, commerce, local, national, and regional government, health and transportation.
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