Pro-growth inefficiency: Rents and moral hazard in infrastructure contests in China

IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study contests for promotion of local government leaders orchestrated by the central government in China. The contests rewarded regional economic success. The probability of promotion increased with regional infrastructure investment but we find negative returns from infrastructure. We find feedback between corruption and investment in infrastructure. There was moral hazard – successful local government leaders who were promoted to higher level positions in the government and Party hierarchical structure left behind regional local governments mired in debt or bankruptcy because of debt financing of infrastructure investment that was used to win the center-orchestrated contests. Our study makes a contribution to contest theory by providing an empirical study for rent-seeking contests.

支持增长的低效率:中国基础设施竞赛中的租金和道德风险
我们研究了中国中央政府策划的地方政府领导人晋升竞赛。这些竞赛奖励地区经济的成功。晋升的概率随着地区基础设施投资的增加而增加,但我们发现基础设施的回报是负的。我们发现腐败与基础设施投资之间存在反馈。这其中存在道德风险--成功的地方政府领导人被提拔到政府和党内更高层次的职位上,但留下的地区地方政府却深陷债务或破产的泥潭,因为他们利用基础设施投资的债务融资赢得了中央政府策划的竞赛。我们的研究通过对寻租竞争的实证研究,为竞争理论做出了贡献。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.40
自引率
10.00%
发文量
106
期刊介绍: The aim of the European Journal of Political Economy is to disseminate original theoretical and empirical research on economic phenomena within a scope that encompasses collective decision making, political behavior, and the role of institutions. Contributions are invited from the international community of researchers. Manuscripts must be published in English. Starting 2008, the European Journal of Political Economy is indexed in the Social Sciences Citation Index published by Thomson Scientific (formerly ISI).
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