{"title":"Market competition and strategic choices of electric power sources under fluctuating demand","authors":"Hiroaki Ino , Norimichi Matsueda , Toshihiro Matsumura","doi":"10.1016/j.reseneeco.2021.101280","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study investigates the effects of the introduction of a competitor on the behavior of an incumbent electricity producer who used to be a local monopolist. We especially focus on its implications for the incumbent's decision of capacity choice between two different electric power sources: one with a relatively high production cost (peak-load technology), which is represented by gas-fired power generation, and the other with a relatively high capacity-building cost (base-load technology), which is represented by nuclear power generation. We assume that the entrant does not have access to the latter technology, and also that demand fluctuates over time, as is typically the case with any electricity market. We show that the introduction of a competitor increases the capacity of nuclear power generation if and only if the nuclear power capacity is sufficiently <em>costly</em> to establish, in comparison with the marginal production cost of a gas-fired plant. This result also implies that the competition tends to decrease the nuclear capacity when the level of carbon tax, which raises the relative production cost of gas-fired power generation, is sufficiently <em>high</em>.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47952,"journal":{"name":"Resource and Energy Economics","volume":"68 ","pages":"Article 101280"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Resource and Energy Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0928765521000658","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
This study investigates the effects of the introduction of a competitor on the behavior of an incumbent electricity producer who used to be a local monopolist. We especially focus on its implications for the incumbent's decision of capacity choice between two different electric power sources: one with a relatively high production cost (peak-load technology), which is represented by gas-fired power generation, and the other with a relatively high capacity-building cost (base-load technology), which is represented by nuclear power generation. We assume that the entrant does not have access to the latter technology, and also that demand fluctuates over time, as is typically the case with any electricity market. We show that the introduction of a competitor increases the capacity of nuclear power generation if and only if the nuclear power capacity is sufficiently costly to establish, in comparison with the marginal production cost of a gas-fired plant. This result also implies that the competition tends to decrease the nuclear capacity when the level of carbon tax, which raises the relative production cost of gas-fired power generation, is sufficiently high.
期刊介绍:
Resource and Energy Economics provides a forum for high level economic analysis of utilization and development of the earth natural resources. The subject matter encompasses questions of optimal production and consumption affecting energy, minerals, land, air and water, and includes analysis of firm and industry behavior, environmental issues and public policies. Implications for both developed and developing countries are of concern. The journal publishes high quality papers for an international audience. Innovative energy, resource and environmental analyses, including theoretical models and empirical studies are appropriate for publication in Resource and Energy Economics.