The National Protection War and the Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Warlordism

Abstract

In 1915–1916, a coalition under the joint leadership of the military officers Cai E, Tang Jiyao, and Li Liejun fought the National Protection War 护国战争 to prevent Yuan Shikai from restoring the monarchy in China. Their declared goal was to defend the Republican polity, yet despite their victory, the Republic did not resurge. I argue that the actions of these men were motivated by two interdependent ideas that decisively contributed to the later rise of warlordism: the assumption that the professional soldier ought to play a prominent role in the Chinese nation-state-building project and the belief that the military man was obligated to defend the Chinese nation against all threats. By tracing the origins, implementation, and reception of these ideas, I focus on the previously neglected intellectual foundations of Chinese warlordism. The victory of Cai and his comrades-in-arms and the overwhelming public appreciation of their actions following the war would come to encourage an ever-growing number of military men—who soon were to be decried as “warlords” 军阀—to also intervene in political affairs.