Time by Heather Dyke (Cambridge University Press, 2021).

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Matias Slavov
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The topic of this book is vast. The author Heather Dyke has less than 80 pages to expound on the nature of time. Her starting point is the distinction between the common-sense conception and the scientific conception of time. The former includes two points: a special present moment and the understanding that time is dynamic. The latter eschews both points. Time begins with a brief historical exposition on the competing stances in the metaphysics of time. Dyke contrasts the Eleatic antichange view with Heraclitean realism about change. McTaggart’s challenge to the reality of time is mentioned and his standard distinction between the A-series and the B-series is discussed throughout the work. Dyke introduces two philosophical tendencies that are in tension. On the one hand, there is the third-person conception of the world, which aims at a subject-neutral characterization of reality. On the other hand, there is the first-person conception of the world, which is about a subjective-relative understanding. In virtue of this distinction, Dyke pursues a top-down analysis of time: ‘Our aim should be to resolve this tension by achieving an understanding of time as it is independently of us, which also accommodates and explains our experience of, and perspective on, time’ (p. 3). Her preferred metaphysics centres on the B-theory. The folk theory of time privileges the present. Whereas one might think that the place ‘here’ is dependent upon a specific location, and hence that it is essentially perspectival, the time ‘now’ is thought to exist independently of location. The absolute ‘now’ is not all that exists, as in that case we could not experience a changing world. There must be change as to what time is ‘now’. There is a continuous transformation between future, present, and past. This aspect is captured by notions like ‘Time marches on’ and ‘Time flows’. Dyke acknowledges that there are other features in the folk conception of time, but takes temporal passage as its central feature. When considering scientific approaches to time, Dyke starts with physics. It is evident that this science, and what it tells about time, has changed in the course of history. Yet she notes, in reference to Callender (2017), that whether we deal with Aristotelian, Newtonian, relativistic, or quantum physics, the ‘now’ has no
希瑟·戴克的《时间》(剑桥大学出版社,2021年)。
这本书的主题很广泛。作者希瑟·戴克用不到80页的篇幅阐述了时间的本质。她的出发点是时间的常识概念和科学概念的区别。前者包括两点:一个特殊的当下时刻和对时间是动态的认识。后者回避了这两点。《时间》首先对时间形而上学的对立立场作一个简短的历史阐述。戴克对比了爱利亚的反变化观点和赫拉克利特的关于变化的现实主义。麦克塔格特对时间现实的挑战被提及,他对a系列和b系列的标准区分在整个作品中被讨论。戴克介绍了两种对立的哲学倾向。一方面,有第三人称世界的概念,其目的是对现实的主体中立的表征。另一方面,第一人称世界观是一种主观相对的理解。凭借这种区别,戴克对时间进行了自上而下的分析:“我们的目标应该是通过实现对时间的理解来解决这种紧张关系,因为它是独立于我们的,这也适应并解释了我们对时间的经验和看法”(第3页)。她偏爱的形而上学集中在b理论上。民间的时间理论优先考虑现在。然而,人们可能会认为“这里”依赖于一个特定的位置,因此它本质上是透视的,时间“现在”被认为是独立于位置存在的。绝对的“现在”并不是存在的全部,因为在这种情况下,我们无法体验到一个变化的世界。关于“现在”是什么时间,必须有所改变。在未来、现在和过去之间有一个持续的转换。“时间在前进”和“时间在流动”等概念体现了这一点。戴克承认民间的时间观念有其他的特征,但把时间的流逝作为其中心特征。在考虑科学的时间方法时,戴克从物理学开始。很明显,这门科学,以及它对时间的描述,在历史的进程中已经发生了变化。然而,她在提到卡伦德(2017)时指出,无论我们处理的是亚里士多德物理学、牛顿物理学、相对论物理学还是量子物理学,“现在”都没有
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Philosophy is the journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, which was founded in 1925 to build bridges between specialist philosophers and a wider educated public. The journal continues to fulfil a dual role: it is one of the leading academic journals of philosophy, but it also serves the philosophical interests of specialists in other fields (law, language, literature and the arts, medicine, politics, religion, science, education, psychology, history) and those of the informed general reader. Contributors are required to avoid needless technicality of language and presentation. The institutional subscription includes two supplements.
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