Yingwen Guo , Yingjie Guo , Phyllis Lai Lan Mo , Xu Zhang
{"title":"Partner-Level internal control opinion shopping and its economic consequences: Evidence from “SOX 404” in an emerging market","authors":"Yingwen Guo , Yingjie Guo , Phyllis Lai Lan Mo , Xu Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2022.107056","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines whether firms engage in internal control opinion shopping (ICOS) at audit partner level and its economic consequences. Based on the Chinese setting where the identities of audit partners are publicly disclosed and the requirements for internal control reporting are akin to SOX 404, we do find that firms successfully engage in ICOS at partner level. Furthermore, partner-level ICOS is associated with lower earnings quality and more tunneling activities. However, it seems that investors are not able to perceive the ICOS behavior, as evidenced by the indistinguishable market reactions to earnings announcements between ICOS firms and their counterparts. Moreover, successful partner-level ICOS firms do not remedy their internal control weaknesses in a timely manner and are more likely to receive sanctions from regulators. Further analyses suggest that firms engaged in partner-level ICOS are more likely to be charged with higher audit fees and firms whose CEOs are about to retire in the near future are more likely to conduct ICOS. This study fills the gap in the literature by investigating the outcomes of and market reactions to opinion shopping in the context of internal controls.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425422001193","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
This study examines whether firms engage in internal control opinion shopping (ICOS) at audit partner level and its economic consequences. Based on the Chinese setting where the identities of audit partners are publicly disclosed and the requirements for internal control reporting are akin to SOX 404, we do find that firms successfully engage in ICOS at partner level. Furthermore, partner-level ICOS is associated with lower earnings quality and more tunneling activities. However, it seems that investors are not able to perceive the ICOS behavior, as evidenced by the indistinguishable market reactions to earnings announcements between ICOS firms and their counterparts. Moreover, successful partner-level ICOS firms do not remedy their internal control weaknesses in a timely manner and are more likely to receive sanctions from regulators. Further analyses suggest that firms engaged in partner-level ICOS are more likely to be charged with higher audit fees and firms whose CEOs are about to retire in the near future are more likely to conduct ICOS. This study fills the gap in the literature by investigating the outcomes of and market reactions to opinion shopping in the context of internal controls.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.