“For I Say”: A Keeper at the Rabbinic Gates of Doubt

Abstract

The rabbinic idiom “for I say” (שאני אומר) has been construed philologically as a specific type of presumption, buttressed with first-person rhetoric. From the perspective of legal analysis, I contend that “for I say” and presumption are diametrically opposed decision-rules, employed consistently in tannaitic and amoraic literature. While presumptions are exclusionary rules, circumscribing doubt, “for I say” is an inclusionary rule, validating doubt. The versatility of the “for I say” rule testifies to its preliminary nature – while the outcome is determined by a robust set of primary decision rules. “For I say” should be read as: for I can say, legitimizing doubt and calling on primary rabbinic rules for treating cases of factual uncertainty, in contestable instances.