How Patronage Delivers: Political Appointments, Bureaucratic Accountability, and Service Delivery in Brazil

IF 5 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Guillermo Toral
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The political appointment of bureaucrats is typically seen as jeopardizing development by selecting worse types into the bureaucracy or by depressing bureaucratic effort. I argue that political appointments also affect outcomes through a third, less studied channel, namely, by changing how bureaucrats work. Patronage provides connections between bureaucrats and politicians, and thereby grants access to material and nonmaterial resources, enhances monitoring, facilitates the application of sanctions and rewards, aligns priorities and incentives, and increases mutual trust. Political appointments can thus enhance bureaucrats’ accountability and effectiveness, not just for rent-seeking purposes but also, in certain conditions, for public service delivery. I test this theory using data on Brazilian municipal governments, leveraging two quasi-experiments, two original surveys of bureaucrats and politicians, and in-depth interviews. The findings highlight the countervailing effects of connections on bureaucratic governance in the developing world.

Abstract Image

赞助人如何发挥作用:巴西的政治任命、官僚问责制和服务提供
对官僚的政治任命通常被认为是通过选择更差的类型进入官僚系统或通过压制官僚的努力来危害发展。我认为,政治任命还通过第三种研究较少的渠道影响结果,即改变官僚的工作方式。裙带关系提供了官僚与政治家之间的联系,从而使官僚能够获得物质和非物质资源,加强监督,便于实施制裁和奖励,调整优先事项和激励措施,并增加相互信任。因此,政治任命可以增强官僚的责任感和效率,不仅可以达到寻租的目的,而且在某些条件下还可以促进公共服务的提供。我利用巴西市政府的数据,通过两个准实验、两项针对官僚和政治家的原创调查以及深入访谈,对这一理论进行了验证。研究结果凸显了人脉关系对发展中国家官僚治理的反作用。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.30
自引率
2.40%
发文量
61
期刊介绍: The American Journal of Political Science (AJPS) publishes research in all major areas of political science including American politics, public policy, international relations, comparative politics, political methodology, and political theory. Founded in 1956, the AJPS publishes articles that make outstanding contributions to scholarly knowledge about notable theoretical concerns, puzzles or controversies in any subfield of political science.
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