Regulatory commitment versus non-commitment: Electric vehicle adoption under subsidies and emission standards

IF 4.6 Q2 MATERIALS SCIENCE, BIOMATERIALS
Bernd Theilen , Françeska Tomori
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We compare two regulatory structures in the application of emission standards and a subsidy scheme in the automobile market. The regulator can either commit to an emission standard or is not able to commit. Firms compete á la Cournot and produce fuel-powered and electric vehicles. The emissions of fuel-powered vehicles can be abated by means of investing in emission-reducing innovation. Our results indicate that under commitment there are less emissions, higher subsidies and a major adoption of electric vehicles. By contrast, non-commitment yields more fuel-powered vehicles, more vehicles in total and higher consumer surplus. Electric vehicle producers obtain higher profits under commitment, whereas fuel-powered vehicle producers might be better off under both regulatory structures. Social welfare is higher under non-commitment as long as environmental damages are regarded severe. Otherwise, commitment is socially preferable. This result provides an explanation for observed differences in the duration of environmental standards between the US, the EU and China.

监管承诺与非承诺:补贴和排放标准下的电动汽车采用
我们比较了排放标准应用的两种监管结构和汽车市场的补贴计划。监管机构可以承诺排放标准,也可以不承诺。公司竞争ála Cournot,生产燃料动力和电动汽车。可以通过投资减排创新来减少燃料动力汽车的排放。我们的研究结果表明,在承诺的情况下,排放量减少,补贴增加,电动汽车大量采用。相比之下,不承诺会产生更多的燃料动力汽车、更多的汽车总量和更高的消费者盈余。电动汽车生产商在承诺下获得更高的利润,而燃料汽车生产商可能在这两种监管结构下都会过得更好。只要环境损害被视为严重,在不承诺的情况下,社会福利就会更高。否则,承诺在社会上更可取。这一结果为观察到的美国、欧盟和中国之间环境标准持续时间的差异提供了解释。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
ACS Applied Bio Materials
ACS Applied Bio Materials Chemistry-Chemistry (all)
CiteScore
9.40
自引率
2.10%
发文量
464
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