{"title":"Branching Out: Banking, Credit, and the Globalizing US Economy, 1900s–1930s","authors":"Marilyn Bridges","doi":"10.1017/eso.2021.51","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Daniel DeMenocal arrived in Hong Kong in the early 1900s as the first US staffer of one of the earliest US bank branches in Asia. Of all the things that might have impressed him—China’s treaty ports, financing opium trade, the language barrier—one that stuck out was the handwriting: “These young Britishers all had extremely good hand-writing,” he later recalled.1 DeMenocal learned the consequences of sloppywriting, after several colleagues from the International Banking Corporation were demoted over their poor handwriting. The bank sent young US staffers like De Menocal to London to learn proper British banking methods. At the time, the idea of a US “international banker” hardly existed. Training in Londonwas a way to counter the deficit in domestic know-how. But when De Menocal’s colleagues failed to master penmanship, they had to prolong their stay. “[T]heir handwriting was so bad,” recalled De Menocal, “that the London office could make no use of their service and they were all sent to an English school to be taught how to write before they were permitted to touch pen to paper.”2 As De Menocal learned, legible and accurate records were essential to the success of financial institutions, and those institutions were themselves vital linkages connecting imperial metropoles and their colonies, territories, andmarkets around the world. Clean handwriting and rigorous bookkeeping constituted the prosaic foundations onwhich financial empires were built.3 My dissertation, “Branching Out: Banking, Credit, and the Globalizing US Economy, 1900s–1930s,” investigates these foundations. It untangles the interrelations of expanding US global power in the early twentieth century and the protocols and paperwork of US foreign banking that undergirded it. Doing so reveals that US empire-building was not a coherent,monolithic project devised inWashington, DC, boardrooms but insteadwas amessy coproduction of often divergent publicand private-sector agendas. Despite their tensions, these agendas nevertheless had the effect of expanding US influence around the world.","PeriodicalId":45977,"journal":{"name":"Enterprise & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Enterprise & Society","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/eso.2021.51","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Daniel DeMenocal arrived in Hong Kong in the early 1900s as the first US staffer of one of the earliest US bank branches in Asia. Of all the things that might have impressed him—China’s treaty ports, financing opium trade, the language barrier—one that stuck out was the handwriting: “These young Britishers all had extremely good hand-writing,” he later recalled.1 DeMenocal learned the consequences of sloppywriting, after several colleagues from the International Banking Corporation were demoted over their poor handwriting. The bank sent young US staffers like De Menocal to London to learn proper British banking methods. At the time, the idea of a US “international banker” hardly existed. Training in Londonwas a way to counter the deficit in domestic know-how. But when De Menocal’s colleagues failed to master penmanship, they had to prolong their stay. “[T]heir handwriting was so bad,” recalled De Menocal, “that the London office could make no use of their service and they were all sent to an English school to be taught how to write before they were permitted to touch pen to paper.”2 As De Menocal learned, legible and accurate records were essential to the success of financial institutions, and those institutions were themselves vital linkages connecting imperial metropoles and their colonies, territories, andmarkets around the world. Clean handwriting and rigorous bookkeeping constituted the prosaic foundations onwhich financial empires were built.3 My dissertation, “Branching Out: Banking, Credit, and the Globalizing US Economy, 1900s–1930s,” investigates these foundations. It untangles the interrelations of expanding US global power in the early twentieth century and the protocols and paperwork of US foreign banking that undergirded it. Doing so reveals that US empire-building was not a coherent,monolithic project devised inWashington, DC, boardrooms but insteadwas amessy coproduction of often divergent publicand private-sector agendas. Despite their tensions, these agendas nevertheless had the effect of expanding US influence around the world.
Daniel DeMenocal于20世纪初抵达香港,成为美国在亚洲最早的银行分行之一的第一位美国员工。在所有可能给他留下深刻印象的事情中——中国的条约港口、资助鸦片贸易、语言障碍——最突出的是笔迹:“这些年轻的英国人都写得非常好,”他后来回忆道,国际银行公司的几位同事因字迹不好而被降职。该银行派遣了像De Menocal这样的年轻美国员工前往伦敦学习正确的英国银行业务方法。当时,美国“国际银行家”的概念几乎不存在。在伦敦进行培训是弥补国内专业知识不足的一种方式。但是,当德梅诺卡尔的同事们未能掌握书法时,他们不得不延长逗留时间。De Menocal回忆道:“他们的笔迹太差了,以至于伦敦办事处无法利用他们的服务,他们都被送到一所英语学校学习如何写字,然后才被允许用笔写字。”2正如De Menocall所学到的,清晰准确的记录对金融机构的成功至关重要,这些机构本身就是连接帝国大都市及其殖民地、领土和世界各地市场的重要纽带。干净的笔迹和严谨的记账构成了金融帝国建立的平淡基础。3我的论文《分支:银行、信贷和全球化的美国经济,19000-2030年代》调查了这些基础。它解开了20世纪初美国全球实力扩张的相互关系,以及支撑它的美国外国银行业的协议和文书工作。这样做表明,美国帝国的建设并不是在华盛顿特区董事会设计的一个连贯、单一的项目,而是一个经常不同的公共和私营部门议程的共同产物。尽管关系紧张,但这些议程还是扩大了美国在世界各地的影响力。
期刊介绍:
Enterprise & Society offers a forum for research on the historical relations between businesses and their larger political, cultural, institutional, social, and economic contexts. The journal aims to be truly international in scope. Studies focused on individual firms and industries and grounded in a broad historical framework are welcome, as are innovative applications of economic or management theories to business and its context.