Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order

Abstract

hydrocarbon fields in eastern Libya, it really does not need warlord Khalifa Haftar, the front man who provided Moscow its initial entry point to this strategically important North African country. Russia has moved on to strike deals with Haftar’s rivals in Libya, hedging Moscow’s bets. And just how does any Libyan actor reel Russia in at this point, much less ask them to depart? In Sudan, Russia’s Wagner mercenaries have secured gold mines in the west and trafficking routes through CAR to the United Arab Emirates. In March 2022, Wagner was implicated in the killing of dozens of miners in this region along the Sudan, Chad, and CAR border. This mirrors allegations of Wagner human rights abuses in CAR and Mali. Once Russia has gained a foothold, local communities and even national authorities are intimidated into exclusion – within their own countries. This represents a form of natural resource annexation that starts under the pretext of security. In CAR, a Russian is the national security advisor and Wagner serves as the presidential guard. Russians also have taken control of key positions at the Minister of Finance and Customs. Russian is now the third official language in the country. Reflecting on Ramani’s review, one questions the premise that Russia is intent on advancing a multipolar order. Instead, Moscow appears to be pursuing its own order – a network of client states bound to Russia. In this way, it is not so different from the Soviet model for which Putin is so nostalgic. This may not seem like the basis of a very sustainable partnership. Prospects are bleak for economic growth and stability in each African country where Russia has gained influence. Moreover, there are bitter resentments toward Russia for actively subverting democratic transitions in places like Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Uganda, the DRC, and Zimbabwe. Public opinion surveys cited by Ramani indicate Putin and Russia are decidedly unpopular with ordinary African citizens. But under Russia’s elite co-option model, African public opinion doesn’t matter. From Moscow’s perspective, the disruption strategy is unfolding according to plan.