III. The Politics of Gulf–Asian Security Cooperation

Abstract

Security cooperation remains the most concrete expression of a rapprochement between two countries. It indicates the operation of a diplomatic proximity and ensures that public pledges are substantiated. At the same time, bilateral security cooperation can only become effective if the capabilities of both sides are meaningful by themselves. In other words, exchanges between security forces – intelligence services, military or police forces – will have strategic significance not simply because of the aspirations of national leaders, but because of technical criteria: the readiness and interoperability of their personnel; the frequency of their interactions with the other side; and the scope of the exchanges all inform the level of operation for a bilateral security cooperation. This is why, in the case of Gulf–Asian relations, this cooperation has to be understood in the broader context of the evolution of both Asian and Gulf security politics. During the past decade, while Gulf energy exports have leaned towards the Asia-Pacific region, national armed forces in the peninsula have undergone an ambitious modernisation process. The traditional reliance on US protection through military bases operated by US armed forces in the region remains valid, but its extent has lessened compared to the 1990s. This is the result of changes in terms of capabilities, training and strategic ambitions of Gulf states. The massive arms sales of the past two decades and the rise of a new generation of officers educated since the 1991 Gulf War are now turning the militaries of countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE into major regional players. At the same time, Gulf leaders have become more strategically ambitious. The UAE and Qatar contributed to NATO air operations in Libya in 2011 as well as to