Public transport frequency and risk-taking behavior

Abstract

When travellers connect to a transit service from a different mode, they must arrive at the connection in a timely manner. If there is uncertainty about the required time to meet the connection, some users might engage in risky behavior by, e.g., increasing their traveling speed. We examine whether the frequency level at a transfer connection may influence the incentive to engage in such risky behavior. We develop an optimization model in which users select an optimal speed in a two-stage process. A simulation study is performed to study the behavior within a wide range of possible preferences and trip characteristics. Our results suggest that increasing the departure frequency may provide a greater incentive for engaging in risky behavior – increasing social costs by increasing the number of accidents. The result is dependent upon average trip length, the initial frequency and the user's perception of scheduling cost. Policy makers should consider the possibly increased accident costs when altering the service level at a transfer connection.