Equity incentives and conforming tax avoidance

Abstract

We examine how executive equity incentives are associated with firms' conforming tax avoidance. Conforming tax avoidance is unique compared to nonconforming tax avoidance in that it decreases tax liabilities by reducing pretax income. Thus, conforming tax avoidance presents a unique set of consequences with important links to both risk and value-creation incentives. Consistent with risk-taking incentives increasing conforming tax avoidance, we find that linking executive wealth to stock price volatility (i.e., vega) is positively associated with conforming tax avoidance. We also find that linking executive wealth to stock price (i.e., delta) is negatively associated with conforming tax avoidance. The results of our cross-sectional tests suggest that the negative association between delta and conforming tax avoidance is predominantly driven by a risk aversion effect rather than a value-creation effect. Our findings add to the literature on the relation between tax avoidance and executive compensation, as well as the trade-off between book and taxable income.