How the Party Commands the Gun: The Foreign–Domestic Threat Dilemma in China

Abstract

The leaders of one-party states face a dilemma between building a loyal military to guard against domestic threats and a competent military that can guard against foreign threats. In this paper, I argue that leaders respond to increasing domestic threats by increasing an emphasis on officer loyalty. I draw on a new dataset, the first of its kind, of over 10,000 appointments to the People’s Liberation Army of China. The data shows that factional ties to leaders are key for promotion but that leaders generally attempt to balance loyalty with competency. Yet in periods of high domestic threat, civilian leaders promote unusually large numbers of officers with factional ties to themselves. Doing so erodes the competence of the officer corps, potentially leaving the regime more vulnerable to foreign threats. The article challenges the conventional wisdom, showing how autocrats face a trade-off between guarding against internal and external threats.