{"title":"Attack and defence methods in cyber-physical power system","authors":"Ting Yang, Yuzhe Liu, Wei Li","doi":"10.1049/esi2.12068","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>With the development of digitalisation and intelligence, the power system has been upgraded from the traditional single energy transmission and conversion system to a complex cyber-physical power system (CPPS) with tightly coupled energy and information flows. The cyber-physical power system achieves the controllability and observability of the power system through ubiquitous sensing technology, advanced measurement technology, and powerful information processing technology. However, the large number of intelligent electronic device accesses and frequent information interactions in CPPS make it more vulnerable and susceptible to be attacked than any previous single structured system. Viruses and intrusions can attack the CPPS through the cyber subsystem, which in turn can deal a fatal blow to the energy supply physical system. Because of the above problems, malicious attacks against CPPS have been occurring in recent years and have generated a great deal of scholarly attention. This paper precisely focusses on this problem, by profiling the structure of CPPS and the potential threats, conducting an in-depth analysis of CPPS attack modes from the cyber and physical subsystems, and summarising the three-level security defence methods for CPPS in detail. Finally, the future technological development prospects of CPPS security research are explicitly addressed, which will provide technical support for building reliable, safe, and robust energy systems.</p>","PeriodicalId":33288,"journal":{"name":"IET Energy Systems Integration","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ietresearch.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1049/esi2.12068","citationCount":"11","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IET Energy Systems Integration","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1049/esi2.12068","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ENERGY & FUELS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 11
Abstract
With the development of digitalisation and intelligence, the power system has been upgraded from the traditional single energy transmission and conversion system to a complex cyber-physical power system (CPPS) with tightly coupled energy and information flows. The cyber-physical power system achieves the controllability and observability of the power system through ubiquitous sensing technology, advanced measurement technology, and powerful information processing technology. However, the large number of intelligent electronic device accesses and frequent information interactions in CPPS make it more vulnerable and susceptible to be attacked than any previous single structured system. Viruses and intrusions can attack the CPPS through the cyber subsystem, which in turn can deal a fatal blow to the energy supply physical system. Because of the above problems, malicious attacks against CPPS have been occurring in recent years and have generated a great deal of scholarly attention. This paper precisely focusses on this problem, by profiling the structure of CPPS and the potential threats, conducting an in-depth analysis of CPPS attack modes from the cyber and physical subsystems, and summarising the three-level security defence methods for CPPS in detail. Finally, the future technological development prospects of CPPS security research are explicitly addressed, which will provide technical support for building reliable, safe, and robust energy systems.