{"title":"Strategic Behavior in State Multimember Districts: Does Fielding One Candidate offer a Notable Advantage?","authors":"Julia Marin Hellwege, Ed Gerrish","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12363","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In several U.S. states, legislative districts for the lower chamber are structured as multi-member districts (MMD) electing two or more individuals. Ten states use MMDs, the most common form is a district that elects two candidates (employed in AZ, ND, NJ, SD). Sometimes, parties in these states field only one strong candidate in districts where they have a registration disadvantage, believing this “single shot” strategy improves the election odds. Our research casts doubt on this tactic. It finds that lone Democrats in a pooled sample of three states see a noted <i>disadvantage</i> by widening the electoral gap by 3.3 percentage points on average, meaning that parties are better off running two candidates regardless of their relative quality. However, this effect varies within states. Republicans do not experience a disadvantage, though fewer Democratic-leaning states employ this election method. This research has practical implications for party strategy in MMD states.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"47 3","pages":"677-708"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lsq.12363","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In several U.S. states, legislative districts for the lower chamber are structured as multi-member districts (MMD) electing two or more individuals. Ten states use MMDs, the most common form is a district that elects two candidates (employed in AZ, ND, NJ, SD). Sometimes, parties in these states field only one strong candidate in districts where they have a registration disadvantage, believing this “single shot” strategy improves the election odds. Our research casts doubt on this tactic. It finds that lone Democrats in a pooled sample of three states see a noted disadvantage by widening the electoral gap by 3.3 percentage points on average, meaning that parties are better off running two candidates regardless of their relative quality. However, this effect varies within states. Republicans do not experience a disadvantage, though fewer Democratic-leaning states employ this election method. This research has practical implications for party strategy in MMD states.
期刊介绍：
The Legislative Studies Quarterly is an international journal devoted to the publication of research on representative assemblies. Its purpose is to disseminate scholarly work on parliaments and legislatures, their relations to other political institutions, their functions in the political system, and the activities of their members both within the institution and outside. Contributions are invited from scholars in all countries. The pages of the Quarterly are open to all research approaches consistent with the normal canons of scholarship, and to work on representative assemblies in all settings and all time periods. The aim of the journal is to contribute to the formulation and verification of general theories about legislative systems, processes, and behavior.
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