Conclusion

Abstract

Over the past ten years, Gulf politics have significantly evolved. The uncertainties that surround US policy in the region have triggered a hedging strategy by GCC members. Hedging has been conducted in other places: some European countries have arguably followed a similar approach between the US and Russia, while small states in Asia have also attempted to avoid being trapped in the US–China competition by sustaining political and economic ties with both players. But, as underlined at the beginning of this paper, the politics of the Arabian Peninsula have been under the influence of Western partners for so long that the current emergence of hedging policies in the region may be historically more consequential than it has been for others. This trend should neither be ignored nor exaggerated. The erosion of US power in the Middle East logically urges local actors to revise their security arrangements, or at least to reconsider their priorities. At the same time, the economics of Gulf–Asian relations are likely to remain the driving force of the rapprochement, especially in the field of energy and infrastructure investment. However, many unknowns remain regarding the extent of these Gulf–Asian ties. Although countries have expressed a general interest in military cooperation, the operationalisation of this intent has been modest for the most part. Military-to-military ties have increased through the launch of diverse exercises and joint training activities, but initiatives that go beyond operational matters to include strategic dialogues and the signing of defence agreements have not yet materialised. If in the near future, Gulf and Asian countries were to give texture to the military dimension of their relations, it would eventually alter their regional security arrangements and stir sensitive issues such as Gulf relations towards Pakistan or Asian exchanges with Iran. The situation is made even more complex by the current state of Gulf politics. As the previous chapters argued, the Gulf ‘pivot’ towards Asia is a regional phenomenon, but not a regional policy. The Qatar crisis of June 2017 is a strong reminder of the fundamental disagreements among Gulf monarchies, and of the inability of the GCC to play an effective role as a