A dilemma for reasons additivity

IF 1.2 2区哲学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-12-27 DOI:10.1017/S026626712100033X

G. Keeling

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract This paper presents a dilemma for the additive model of reasons. Either the model accommodates disjunctive cases in which one ought to perform some act $$\phi $$ just in case at least one of two factors obtains, or it accommodates conjunctive cases in which one ought to $$\phi $$ just in case both of two factors obtains. The dilemma also arises in a revised additive model that accommodates imprecisely weighted reasons. There exist disjunctive and conjunctive cases. Hence the additive model is extensionally inadequate. The upshot of the dilemma is that one of the most influential accounts of how reasons accrue to determine what we ought to do is flawed.

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一个进退两难的原因是可加性

摘要本文提出了原因加性模型的一个难题。要么这个模型适用于析取情况在这种情况下一个人应该执行某种行为$$\phi $$只是在至少两个因素中的一个得到满足的情况下，或者它适用于一个人应该$$\phi $$只是在两个因素都得到满足的情况下。这种困境也出现在一个修正的附加模型中，该模型容纳了不精确加权的原因。有析取和合取的情况。因此，加性模型在外延上是不充分的。这一困境的结果是，关于原因如何累积决定我们应该做什么的最具影响力的说法之一是有缺陷的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Economics and Philosophy Multiple-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

8.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.