{"title":"Employment protection regimes and dismissal of members in worker cooperatives","authors":"Ermanno C. Tortia","doi":"10.1016/j.scaman.2022.101213","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In connection with the \"Great Reset\" literature in management and organizational theory, this article discusses human resource sustainability, employment stability, and layoffs in worker cooperatives, a unique organizational form in which employees are members holding residual control rights. Theoretical and empirical contributions show that worker control stabilizes employment better than investor ownership, opening the door to stronger employment protection. The paper leverages key theoretical insights from evolutionary economics and systems theory to discuss the benefits and critical elements associated with limiting member layoffs in worker cooperatives. While strong employment protection can lead to short-term inefficiencies and underperformance due to labour hoarding, imperfections in governance and control mechanisms, it can foster better accumulation and retention of firm-specific human capital and dynamic capabilities, thereby supporting long-term performance.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47759,"journal":{"name":"Scandinavian Journal of Management","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Scandinavian Journal of Management","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0956522122000203","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
In connection with the "Great Reset" literature in management and organizational theory, this article discusses human resource sustainability, employment stability, and layoffs in worker cooperatives, a unique organizational form in which employees are members holding residual control rights. Theoretical and empirical contributions show that worker control stabilizes employment better than investor ownership, opening the door to stronger employment protection. The paper leverages key theoretical insights from evolutionary economics and systems theory to discuss the benefits and critical elements associated with limiting member layoffs in worker cooperatives. While strong employment protection can lead to short-term inefficiencies and underperformance due to labour hoarding, imperfections in governance and control mechanisms, it can foster better accumulation and retention of firm-specific human capital and dynamic capabilities, thereby supporting long-term performance.
期刊介绍:
The Scandinavian Journal of Management (SJM) provides an international forum for innovative and carefully crafted research on different aspects of management. We promote dialogue and new thinking around theory and practice, based on conceptual creativity, reasoned reflexivity and contextual awareness. We have a passion for empirical inquiry. We promote constructive dialogue among researchers as well as between researchers and practitioners. We encourage new approaches to the study of management and we aim to foster new thinking around management theory and practice. We publish original empirical and theoretical material, which contributes to understanding management in private and public organizations. Full-length articles and book reviews form the core of the journal, but focused discussion-type texts (around 3.000-5.000 words), empirically or theoretically oriented, can also be considered for publication. The Scandinavian Journal of Management is open to different research approaches in terms of methodology and epistemology. We are open to different fields of management application, but narrow technical discussions relevant only to specific sub-fields will not be given priority.