The Interpsychic, the Interpersonal, and the Intersubjective: Response to Steven H. Goldberg's Discussion.

Abstract

I am very grateful to Dr. Steven H. Goldberg for his careful, clear, and profound reading of the text of “From What to How: A Conversation with Stefano Bolognini on Emotional Attunement” and for the appropriate questions he raises. Of course, I am unable to address all his questions in a limited space, and I will restrict myself to focusing on the main problem of the distinction between the interpsychic, the interpersonal, and the intersubjective (which of course would also deserve more space for a detailed theoretical exploration). I am aware that intersubjectivists have also described pre-subjective and co-subjective passages; however, I still consider it useful to try to distinguish even more finely the differences between the different functional levels. Drawing on a historical-etymological perspective, I will mention that for the Etruscans and Romans, sonare, “to sound,” had as its third-person singular form sonat, and iper-sonare had the third-person singular form of iper-sonat, from which the word persona (“person”) derives (as well as from the Etruscan phersu, meaning “mask”). Thus, to hyperproduce a sound was to mask the effect of very strong theatrical characters (i.e., to create a “mask-effect”). Therefore, we can say that a person is primarily an identity concept. Being a person is based on a sufficiently clear definition of the individual’s boundaries and characteristics and on a self-representational distinction from the other, especially at the conscious level. This does not imply constant, integrated contact with one’s subjectivity; indeed, some individuals may have a strong, conscious professional or social identity but a significant lack of contact with the self (certain