{"title":"Re Imogen: the role of the Family Court of Australia in disputes over gender dysphoria treatment.","authors":"Georgina Dimopoulos, Michelle Taylor-Sands","doi":"10.1007/s40592-021-00138-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article examines Re Imogen (No 6) (2020) 61 Fam LR 344, a decision of the Family Court of Australia, which held that an application to the Family Court is mandatory if a parent or a medical practitioner of a child or adolescent diagnosed with gender dysphoria disputes the diagnosis, the capacity to consent, or the proposed treatment. First, we explain the regulatory framework for the medical treatment of gender dysphoria in children and adolescents, including the development of the welfare jurisdiction under Section 67ZC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). We then provide an overview of the Re Imogen decision, and discuss the balancing exercise involved in determining a child's best interests in the medical treatment context. We challenge the Family Court's conclusion that, in relation to a dispute about diagnosis or treatment, a finding that the child or adolescent is Gillick competent to consent to treatment is not determinative, and the Family Court must determine the dispute. We argue that this conclusion represents an unjustified incursion into the right of Gillick competent transgender children and adolescents to make decisions about their own bodies and identities, and that the protective role of parents and the Family Court cannot justify interfering with their bodily autonomy in this context. Finally, we propose an alternative regulatory framework that removes the Family Court from the medical treatment process for gender dysphoria in circumstances of dispute between a parent and their Gillick competent child.</p>","PeriodicalId":43628,"journal":{"name":"Monash Bioethics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Monash Bioethics Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s40592-021-00138-0","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2021/9/19 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
This article examines Re Imogen (No 6) (2020) 61 Fam LR 344, a decision of the Family Court of Australia, which held that an application to the Family Court is mandatory if a parent or a medical practitioner of a child or adolescent diagnosed with gender dysphoria disputes the diagnosis, the capacity to consent, or the proposed treatment. First, we explain the regulatory framework for the medical treatment of gender dysphoria in children and adolescents, including the development of the welfare jurisdiction under Section 67ZC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). We then provide an overview of the Re Imogen decision, and discuss the balancing exercise involved in determining a child's best interests in the medical treatment context. We challenge the Family Court's conclusion that, in relation to a dispute about diagnosis or treatment, a finding that the child or adolescent is Gillick competent to consent to treatment is not determinative, and the Family Court must determine the dispute. We argue that this conclusion represents an unjustified incursion into the right of Gillick competent transgender children and adolescents to make decisions about their own bodies and identities, and that the protective role of parents and the Family Court cannot justify interfering with their bodily autonomy in this context. Finally, we propose an alternative regulatory framework that removes the Family Court from the medical treatment process for gender dysphoria in circumstances of dispute between a parent and their Gillick competent child.
本文审查了Re Imogen (No 6) (2020) 61 Fam LR 344,这是澳大利亚家庭法院的一项决定,该决定认为,如果被诊断患有性别焦虑症的儿童或青少年的父母或医生对诊断、同意能力或拟议的治疗提出异议,则必须向家庭法院提出申请。首先,我们解释了儿童和青少年性别不安的医疗监管框架,包括根据1975年《家庭法》(Cth)第67ZC条制定的福利管辖权。然后,我们概述了雷伊莫金的决定,并讨论了在医疗环境中确定儿童最大利益所涉及的平衡练习。我们质疑家事法院的结论,即在关于诊断或治疗的争议中,发现儿童或青少年吉利克有能力同意治疗不是决定性的,家事法院必须决定争议。我们认为,这一结论代表了对Gillick有能力的跨性别儿童和青少年对自己的身体和身份做出决定的权利的不合理侵犯,父母和家庭法院的保护作用不能证明在这种情况下干涉他们的身体自主权是正当的。最后,我们提出了另一种监管框架,即在父母和他们的吉利克称职的孩子之间发生纠纷的情况下,将家庭法院从性别不安的医疗过程中移除。
期刊介绍:
Monash Bioethics Review provides comprehensive coverage of traditional topics and emerging issues in bioethics. The Journal is especially concerned with empirically-informed philosophical bioethical analysis with policy relevance. Monash Bioethics Review also regularly publishes empirical studies providing explicit ethical analysis and/or with significant ethical or policy implications. Produced by the Monash University Centre for Human Bioethics since 1981 (originally as Bioethics News), Monash Bioethics Review is the oldest peer reviewed bioethics journal based in Australia–and one of the oldest bioethics journals in the world.
An international forum for empirically-informed philosophical bioethical analysis with policy relevance.
Includes empirical studies providing explicit ethical analysis and/or with significant ethical or policy implications.
One of the oldest bioethics journals, produced by a world-leading bioethics centre.
Publishes papers up to 13,000 words in length.
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