Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions.

IF 1.3 2区经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Pub Date : 2021-01-01 Epub Date: 2021-07-23 DOI:10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x

Johannes Buckenmaier, Eugen Dimant, Ann-Christin Posten, Ulrich Schmidt

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Abstract

Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider two dimensions: the timing at which the uncertainty about whether one will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination thereof. By varying these dimensions of delay systematically, we find a surprising non-monotonic relation with deterrence: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as possible delayed) emerge as most effective at deterring deviant behavior and recidivism. Our results yield implications for the design of institutional policies aimed at mitigating misconduct and reducing recidivism.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at doi:10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x.

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高效制度与有效威慑：论正式制裁的时机和不确定性》。

经济学理论认为，惩罚的严厉性和确定性共同决定了对异常行为的威慑力。本文首次通过对照实验研究了第三个主要被忽视的重要因素：正式制裁的迅速性。我们考虑了两个维度：是否会受到惩罚的不确定性解除的时间和实际实施惩罚的时间，以及两者的结合。通过系统地改变延迟的这些维度，我们发现延迟与威慑力之间存在着令人惊讶的非单调关系：无论是无延迟（立即解决和立即惩罚）还是最大延迟（尽可能延迟解决和惩罚），都能最有效地威慑异常行为和累犯。我们的研究结果对设计旨在减轻不当行为和减少累犯的制度政策具有启示意义：在线版本包含补充材料，可在以下网址获取：doi:10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x。

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来源期刊

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Multiple-

CiteScore

6.30

自引率

10.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (JRU) welcomes original empirical, experimental, and theoretical manuscripts dealing with the analysis of risk-bearing behavior and decision making under uncertainty. The topics covered in the journal include, but are not limited to, decision theory and the economics of uncertainty, experimental investigations of behavior under uncertainty, empirical studies of real world risk-taking behavior, behavioral models of choice under uncertainty, and risk and public policy. Review papers are welcome. The JRU does not publish finance or behavioral finance research, game theory, note length work, or papers that treat Likert-type scales as having cardinal significance. An important aim of the JRU is to encourage interdisciplinary communication and interaction between researchers in the area of risk and uncertainty. Authors are expected to provide introductory discussions which set forth the nature of their research and the interpretation and implications of their findings in a manner accessible to knowledgeable researchers in other disciplines. Officially cited as: J Risk Uncertain