The impact of hospital-acquired infections on the patient-level reimbursement-cost relationship in a DRG-based hospital payment system.

IF 1.5 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Klaus Kaier, Martin Wolkewitz, Philip Hehn, Nico T Mutters, Thomas Heister
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) are a common complication in inpatient care. We investigate the incentives to prevent HAIs under the German DRG-based reimbursement system. We analyze the relationship between resource use and reimbursements for HAI in 188,731 patient records from the University Medical Center Freiburg (2011-2014), comparing cases to appropriate non-HAI controls. Resource use is approximated using national standardized costing system data. Reimbursements are the actual payments to hospitals under the G-DRG system. Timing of HAI exposure, cost-clustering within main diagnoses and risk-adjustment are considered. The reimbursement-cost difference of HAI patients is negative (approximately - €4000). While controls on average also have a negative reimbursement-cost difference (approximately - €2000), HAI significantly increase this difference after controlling for confounding and timing of infection (- 1500, p < 0.01). HAIs caused by vancomycin-resistant Enterococci have the most unfavorable reimbursement-cost difference (- €10,800), significantly higher (- €9100, p < 0.05) than controls. Among infection types, pneumonia is associated with highest losses (- €8400 and - €5700 compared with controls, p < 0.05), while cost-reimbursement relationship for Clostridium difficile-associated diarrhea is comparatively balanced (- €3200 and - €500 compared to controls, p = 0.198). From the hospital administration's perspective, it is not the additional costs of HAIs, but rather the cost-reimbursement relationship which guides decisions. Costs exceeding reimbursements for HAI may increase infection prevention and control efforts and can be used to show their cost-effectiveness from the hospital perspective.

基于drg的医院支付系统中医院获得性感染对患者级报销-成本关系的影响。
医院获得性感染(HAIs)是住院治疗中常见的并发症。我们调查了在德国基于drg的报销制度下预防HAIs的激励措施。我们分析了来自弗莱堡大学医学中心(University Medical Center Freiburg)的188,731例患者记录(2011-2014)的资源使用与HAI报销之间的关系,并将病例与适当的非HAI对照进行了比较。使用国家标准化成本系统数据估算资源使用情况。偿还款项是根据G-DRG制度支付给医院的实际款项。考虑了HAI暴露的时机、主要诊断中的成本聚类和风险调整。HAI患者的报销成本差异为负(约- 4000欧元)。虽然对照组平均也有负的报销成本差异(约- 2000欧元),但在控制了混淆和感染时间后,HAI显著增加了这一差异(- 1500,p
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
18
期刊介绍: The focus of the International Journal of Health Economics and Management is on health care systems and on the behavior of consumers, patients, and providers of such services. The links among management, public policy, payment, and performance are core topics of the relaunched journal. The demand for health care and its cost remain central concerns. Even as medical innovation allows providers to improve the lives of their patients, questions remain about how to efficiently deliver health care services, how to pay for it, and who should pay for it. These are central questions facing innovators, providers, and payers in the public and private sectors. One key to answering these questions is to understand how people choose among alternative arrangements, either in markets or through the political process. The choices made by healthcare managers concerning the organization and production of that care are also crucial. There is an important connection between the management of a health care system and its economic performance. The primary audience for this journal will be health economists and researchers in health management, along with the larger group of health services researchers. In addition, research and policy analysis reported in the journal should be of interest to health care providers, managers and policymakers, who need to know about the pressures facing insurers and governments, with consequences for regulation and mandates. The editors of the journal encourage submissions that analyze the behavior and interaction of the actors in health care, viz. consumers, providers, insurers, and governments. Preference will be given to contributions that combine theoretical with empirical work, evaluate conflicting findings, present new information, or compare experiences between countries and jurisdictions. In addition to conventional research articles, the journal will include specific subsections for shorter concise research findings and cont ributions to management and policy that provide important descriptive data or arguments about what policies follow from research findings. The composition of the editorial board is designed to cover the range of interest among economics and management researchers.Officially cited as: Int J Health Econ ManagFrom 2001 to 2014 the journal was published as International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics. (Articles published in Vol. 1-14 officially cited as: Int J Health Care Finance Econ)
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