{"title":"Ethical considerations in the aversive control of behavior","authors":"Hank Davis","doi":"10.1016/0271-5392(81)90027-7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper focusses upon ethical concerns about the use of aversive stimuli to control behavior. Each of the basic aversive control procedures (e.g. punishment, avoidance) is defined, followed by a separate discussion of aversive control work involving animal and human subjects. Aversive control with humans does not pose a major ethical problem insofar as research with aversive stimuli is virtually prohibited, and most behavior modification using noxious stimuli requires informed consent. Those cases in which informed consent is not obtained are ethically troublesome, but for reasons unrelated to the use of aversive stimuli, <em>per se</em>. In contrast, aversive control work with animals is potentially more problematic. Informed consent is not obtainable, and ethical guidelines are generally less rigorous than those involving human subjects. Justification for the use of animal subjects in aversive control experiments typically centers upon the utility or application of the findings, rather than the pursuit of ‘pure knowledge’. However, it is argued that a <em>priori</em> judgements about the utility of research findings may be speculative at best, and lead to facile justifications. It is suggested that, regardless of how they are justified, aversive control experiments with animal subjects should employ a moderate range of stimulus parameters, although a survey of the experimental literature suggests that this has not been the case. Finally, a number of seemingly anomalous findings, related to the prediction and control of aversive stimuli, are surveyed. These results challenge the simplistic view that shock <em>qua</em> shock is cruel, and that cruelty increases linearly with the number of shocks delivered. These findings, and the principles they embody, may themselves be applied to the design of subsequent experiments. In short, the utility principle can be extended beyond its usual application to human suffering, and applied to the design of more humane, and equally sensitive research with aversive stimuli.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":79378,"journal":{"name":"Social science & medicine. Part F, Medical & social ethics","volume":"15 1","pages":"Pages 61-67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1981-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/0271-5392(81)90027-7","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social science & medicine. Part F, Medical & social ethics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0271539281900277","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
This paper focusses upon ethical concerns about the use of aversive stimuli to control behavior. Each of the basic aversive control procedures (e.g. punishment, avoidance) is defined, followed by a separate discussion of aversive control work involving animal and human subjects. Aversive control with humans does not pose a major ethical problem insofar as research with aversive stimuli is virtually prohibited, and most behavior modification using noxious stimuli requires informed consent. Those cases in which informed consent is not obtained are ethically troublesome, but for reasons unrelated to the use of aversive stimuli, per se. In contrast, aversive control work with animals is potentially more problematic. Informed consent is not obtainable, and ethical guidelines are generally less rigorous than those involving human subjects. Justification for the use of animal subjects in aversive control experiments typically centers upon the utility or application of the findings, rather than the pursuit of ‘pure knowledge’. However, it is argued that a priori judgements about the utility of research findings may be speculative at best, and lead to facile justifications. It is suggested that, regardless of how they are justified, aversive control experiments with animal subjects should employ a moderate range of stimulus parameters, although a survey of the experimental literature suggests that this has not been the case. Finally, a number of seemingly anomalous findings, related to the prediction and control of aversive stimuli, are surveyed. These results challenge the simplistic view that shock qua shock is cruel, and that cruelty increases linearly with the number of shocks delivered. These findings, and the principles they embody, may themselves be applied to the design of subsequent experiments. In short, the utility principle can be extended beyond its usual application to human suffering, and applied to the design of more humane, and equally sensitive research with aversive stimuli.