Contract Design and Driver Allocation Under Information Asymmetry in Ride-Hailing Platforms

IF 2.2 4区 工程技术 Q2 ENGINEERING, CIVIL
Shivshanker Singh Patel, Shivi Goel, Reetendra Singh
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Abstract

The equitability of ride-hailing platforms needs to be studied from the perspective of drivers, particularly in terms of risk exposure, job security, and access to livable wages. The conflicts emerge between platforms and drivers, when platforms make policy decisions while drivers rarely intervene. Disparities in drivers’ income, supply and demand distribution, traffic conditions, and information asymmetry further exacerbate this problem. To resolve and ensure improved working contracts for gig-economy workers, a socioeconomic solution is required. This study applies principal-agent theory to model the platform–driver relationship over three nested decision horizons: per-ride, weekly, and yearly. Utility functions are developed from the revenues earned and costs incurred by both parties, and closed-form participation thresholds for the platform commission rate are derived and numerically illustrated. Three contract structures, commission based, subscription based, and fixed income, are formally compared, and their risk-allocation and self-selection properties under driver heterogeneity are characterized. Passengers and regulators enter the model in reduced form through a commission-sensitive ride-volume function and policy constraints, respectively. The analysis yields implementable guidance for tiered commission design, surge-based incentives, and transparency-oriented regulation.

Abstract Image

信息不对称下网约车平台的契约设计与司机配置
网约车平台的公平性需要从司机的角度来研究,特别是在风险暴露、工作保障和获得宜居工资方面。平台和司机之间的冲突出现了,当平台做出决策时,司机很少干预。司机收入、供需分布、交通状况和信息不对称等方面的差异进一步加剧了这一问题。为了解决和确保改善零工经济工人的工作合同,需要一个社会经济解决方案。本研究应用委托-代理理论在三个嵌套的决策范围(每次、每周和每年)上对平台驾驶员关系进行建模。效用函数由双方的收入和成本发展而来,并推导出平台佣金率的封闭式参与阈值,并用数值说明。对佣金型、认购型和固定收益型三种契约结构进行了比较,分析了三种契约结构在驱动因素异质性下的风险分配和自我选择特性。乘客和监管者分别通过佣金敏感的乘车量函数和政策约束以简化的形式进入该模型。该分析为分级佣金设计、基于高峰的激励措施和面向透明度的监管提供了可实施的指导。
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来源期刊
Journal of Advanced Transportation
Journal of Advanced Transportation 工程技术-工程:土木
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
8.70%
发文量
466
审稿时长
7.3 months
期刊介绍: The Journal of Advanced Transportation (JAT) is a fully peer reviewed international journal in transportation research areas related to public transit, road traffic, transport networks and air transport. It publishes theoretical and innovative papers on analysis, design, operations, optimization and planning of multi-modal transport networks, transit & traffic systems, transport technology and traffic safety. Urban rail and bus systems, Pedestrian studies, traffic flow theory and control, Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) and automated and/or connected vehicles are some topics of interest. Highway engineering, railway engineering and logistics do not fall within the aims and scope of JAT.
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