When Criticism Fails: An Answer to Kelly (2026) on Debunking When Prophecy Fails

Abstract

In his recent article, Kelly (2026) accuses Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter of intentionally misrepresenting their 1956 foundational study, When Prophecy Fails. While we acknowledge Kelly's contribution to the literature, we contest the interpretative leap from documenting misrepresentation to alleging intentional misconduct. To illustrate this point, we analysed Kelly's interpretation of Henry Riecken's role, showing how the same archival material can be used to support alternative plausible interpretations. In the absence of clear archival evidence directly supporting the allegation of intentional misconduct, we believe that the move from distortion to misconduct is insufficiently warranted. Our main concern with Kelly's article is therefore that it treats archival materials as if they could support the kind of interpretative closure associated with experimental proof. In doing so, his article risks limiting the very methodological dialogue the psychological humanities seek to foster. A historically reflexive and psychologically informed critique should preserve space for alternative explanations, especially where researchers' theoretical commitments may influence their interpretation of evidence. Allegations of intentional misconduct therefore require strong evidence and serious engagement with such alternatives. In the case of When Prophecy Fails, we believe that this standard has not been met.