Three Paradoxes of Duties to Oneself

Abstract

Abstract Duties to self have long been dismissed on the grounds that they are not ‘binding’, since one could waive them at will—the classic ‘Paradox of Self-Release’. A standard response is that duties to self can bind because they are unwaivable. We argue that this response does not go far enough, because even if one has an unwaivable duty not to self-harm, the act of harming oneself forfeits that duty before it can be violated; thus even unwaivable duties to self fail to bind. This ‘Paradox of Self-Forfeiture’, we argue, has no easy solution. From there, we introduce an Escheresque ‘Paradox of Inconsistent Forfeiture’—again, with no easy way out—and extend both new paradoxes to the realm of self-respect. Along the way we draw several morals about forfeiture and the nature of duties to self.