Disentangling GPS from Nudging: Why the Distinction Matters for the Ethics of Nudging

Abstract

Nudge theory proposes to deliberately alter people’s behaviour or choices for their welfare. Based on insights from behavioural economics, choice architects intentionally design nudges to influence agents’ behaviour or choices towards specific options as judged by themselves. In the context of nudging practices, GPS is frequently referred to as a “prime” example of nudging. The problem is not only that GPS is misclassified as a nudge, but also that it is invoked to launder ethical concerns associated with other nudges by importing the moral intuitions of a tool into the governance of libertarian paternalistic choice architecture. Proponents claim that, since GPS is an ethically uncontroversial nudge, similar acceptance should be extended to other nudges. However, we argue that this comparison overlooks critical distinctions in the design objectives and applications of GPS and nudges. During navigation, the primary purpose of GPS is to provide users with efficient route guidance and to enhance user experience based on user input. Unlike navigation by GPS, nudges aim to steer individuals’ behaviour or choices away from one option and gently guide them towards another option through choice architecture. This paper distinguishes the structure and purpose behind the design of nudges from that of GPS. Based on the necessary conditions of a nudge, we demonstrate that GPS does not meet the criteria for being classified as a nudge. Therefore, GPS should not be considered a nudge and, hence, cannot be used as a prime example of a nudge to justify nudging in ethical discourse.