Money, Time, and Grant Design

IF 6.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Kyle Myers,Wei Yang Tham
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We conduct survey experiments to test how the design of scientific grants—the money and time awarded—can be used to manage researchers. On average, researchers are relatively unwilling to trade off money for time when choosing among grants. However, there is significant heterogeneity in researchers' preferences. Conditional on receiving a grant, different designs cause only minor changes in researchers' plans for how they would use the funding. Marginal changes in grant design are more relevant for selection effects (funders' ability to attract certain researchers) than treatment effects (funders' ability to change researchers' strategies). (JEL C83, I23, O31)
金钱、时间和授权设计
我们进行调查实验,以测试科学拨款的设计——奖励的金钱和时间——如何用于管理研究人员。平均而言,研究人员在选择资助时相对不愿意用金钱来换取时间。然而,研究人员的偏好存在显著的异质性。在获得资助的条件下,不同的设计只会对研究人员如何使用资金的计划造成微小的改变。拨款设计的边际变化与选择效应(资助者吸引某些研究人员的能力)比治疗效应(资助者改变研究人员策略的能力)更相关。(jel 83, i23, o31)
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.10
自引率
1.60%
发文量
63
期刊介绍: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics publishes papers covering a range of topics in applied economics, with a focus on empirical microeconomic issues. In particular, we welcome papers on labor economics, development microeconomics, health, education, demography, empirical corporate finance, empirical studies of trade, and empirical behavioral economics.
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