When to share content to rival platforms?

IF 6.8 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Electronic Commerce Research and Applications Pub Date : 2026-09-01 Epub Date: 2026-09-19 DOI:10.1016/j.elerap.2026.101638

Hongyan Xu, Nengyue Zhu, He Huang, Yifan Dou

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This research explores the content sharing strategy of competing music platforms offering online music services. We address two issues: the distribution of exclusive copyrights and rival procurement of licensed copyrights. The distribution generates the effects of copyright sharing and copyright acquiring. We find that under the scenario where only one platform can distribute exclusive copyrights, a unilateral distribution equilibrium, in which one platform distributes copyrights and the rival procures licensed copyrights, arises when the distribution share is low and the base payout rate is moderate, or when the distribution share is high and the base payout rate is not high. By contrast, under the scenario where both platforms can distribute exclusive copyrights, a bilateral distribution equilibrium, in which both platforms distribute copyrights and procure licensed copyrights from each other, arises when the copyright value is low and the base payout rate is high, or when the copyright value is not high and the base payout rate is low. Moreover, a higher distribution share of exclusive copyrights or stronger network effects may hinder the unilateral (bilateral) distribution equilibrium under the scenario where only one platform (both platforms) can distribute copyrights. Additionally, unilateral or bilateral distribution does not necessarily bring higher social welfare. For consumers, bilateral distribution is more favorable than unilateral distribution.

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什么时候向竞争对手平台分享内容？

本研究探讨了提供在线音乐服务的竞争音乐平台的内容共享策略。我们解决两个问题：独家版权的分销和许可版权的竞争采购。这种分配产生了版权共享和版权获取的效果。我们发现，在只有一个平台可以分销独家版权的情况下，当分销份额较低且基础支付率适中，或分销份额较高而基础支付率不高时，会出现一个平台分销版权而竞争对手获得授权版权的单边分销均衡。相比之下，在两个平台都可以分销独家版权的情况下，当版权价值较低，基础支付率较高，或版权价值不高，基础支付率较低时，两平台之间会形成一种双边分销均衡，即两平台相互分销版权并从对方手中获得授权版权。此外，在只有一个平台（两个平台）可以分销版权的情况下，更高的独家版权分销份额或更强的网络效应可能会阻碍单边（双边）分销平衡。此外，单边或双边分配并不一定会带来更高的社会福利。对于消费者来说，双边分配比单边分配更有利。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 工程技术-计算机：跨学科应用

CiteScore

10.10

自引率

8.30%

发文量

审稿时长

63 days

期刊介绍： Electronic Commerce Research and Applications aims to create and disseminate enduring knowledge for the fast-changing e-commerce environment. A major dilemma in e-commerce research is how to achieve a balance between the currency and the life span of knowledge. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications will contribute to the establishment of a research community to create the knowledge, technology, theory, and applications for the development of electronic commerce. This is targeted at the intersection of technological potential and business aims.