Security Design Under Common-Value Competition

IF 6.2 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-09-22 DOI:10.3982/ECTA21366

Yue Yuan

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper studies security design by bidders with dispersed information about a common-value investment opportunity. Among a broad set of securities, bidders offer debt financing—the flattest securities. A first reason is that debt mitigates bidders' exposure to the winner's curse when there are two bidders. Second, the entrepreneur either has an informational advantage initially or gains one by inferring from the bids, and is more likely to select debt offers when optimistic about the project. While a bidder's choice of security also has a signaling effect, this effect is dominated by the winner's curse and informed-selection effects, and does not affect the equilibrium outcome. These results contrast sharply with security design by a monopolistic investor, as well as with DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz's (2005) results under private-value competition. The entrepreneur's ability to commit to an ordered set of securities does not improve revenue.

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共同价值竞争下的安全设计

本文研究了信息分散的共同价值投资机会下投标人的安全设计问题。在众多证券中，竞标者提供的是债务融资——最平淡的证券。第一个原因是，当有两个竞标者时，债务减轻了竞标者遭受赢家诅咒的风险。其次，企业家要么一开始就有信息优势，要么通过投标推断获得信息优势，当对项目持乐观态度时，更有可能选择债务报价。虽然竞标者的证券选择也有信号效应，但这种效应主要受赢家诅咒效应和知情选择效应支配，不影响均衡结果。这些结果与垄断投资者的安全设计，以及DeMarzo， Kremer和Skrzypacz（2005）在私人价值竞争下的结果形成鲜明对比。企业家对一组有序证券的承诺能力并不能提高收入。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Econometrica 社会科学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

11.00

自引率

3.30%

发文量

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

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