Detecting FIMI: A methodological framework for testing OSINT tools in TTPs detection.

Open research Europe Pub Date : 2026-08-08 eCollection Date: 2026-01-01 DOI:10.12688/openreseurope.21702.2
Konstantinos Margaros, Theodoros Paparrigopoulos, Georgios Giataganas, Orfeas Filippopoulos, Nikolaos Georgiou, Oleksandr Manzhai, Panagiota Benekou
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Background: Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) represents a growing hybrid threat targeting democratic processes, social cohesion, and diaspora communities. Detecting it requires identifying underlying tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) described in frameworks such as DISARM, AMITT, and MITRE ATT&CK. Although many open-source intelligence (OSINT) tools exist, their evaluation remains fragmented and lacks methodological standardisation. This article presents a framework for testing OSINT tools for TTP detection, developed within the Horizon Europe project RESONANT.

Methods: The methodology integrates three components: a structured multi-source collection of OSINT tools informed by academic, operational, and grey literature; a controlled, mixed-source evaluation corpus of project-prepared examples, public reference material, and selected third-party datasets across text, multimedia, network and infrastructure analysis; and controlled testing by law enforcement partners from Greece and Ukraine. Tools were classified into eight categories and evaluated using predefined indicators of accuracy, usability, interoperability, coverage of adversarial behaviours, and sustainability.

Results: Several content-verification and multimedia-forensics tools performed well on the retained material, and infrastructure-level tools gave useful indicators; these are time-bound descriptive observations, not general rankings. Exact case-level replication is limited, as the package does not preserve the full CT-A/CT-B mapping, run-level outputs, denominators, or configurations. Social media analytics and bot-detection tools were least stable under platform API restrictions. Shortcomings recurred in multilingual processing, interoperability, explainability, and integration into threat-intelligence formats.

Conclusions: The study offers a transferable methodology for evaluating OSINT tools in the context of FIMI TTP detection. Combining a mixed-source corpus, structured testing, practitioner validation, and publication of the available material, it advances methodological transparency while clarifying the limits of both automated outputs and the retained replication record. The proposed tool suite is a layered decision-support baseline, not a verdict-producing system. Future work should expand multilingual and out-of-distribution testing, operationalise bias and explainability metrics, preserve run-level records, and pursue lawful access to platform data.

检测FIMI:在TTPs检测中测试OSINT工具的方法框架。
背景:外国信息操纵与干涉(FIMI)代表了一种日益增长的针对民主进程、社会凝聚力和侨民社区的混合威胁。检测它需要识别框架中描述的潜在战术、技术和程序(TTPs),如解除武装、AMITT和MITRE ATT&CK。尽管存在许多开源智能(OSINT)工具,但它们的评估仍然是碎片化的,缺乏方法上的标准化。本文介绍了一个测试用于TTP检测的OSINT工具的框架,该框架是在Horizon Europe项目resonance中开发的。方法:该方法集成了三个组成部分:一个结构化的多源OSINT工具集合,由学术、操作和灰色文献提供信息;一个受控的混合源评估语料库,包括项目准备的示例、公共参考材料和选定的第三方数据集,涵盖文本、多媒体、网络和基础设施分析;并由希腊和乌克兰的执法合作伙伴进行控制测试。工具被分为八个类别,并使用预定义的准确性、可用性、互操作性、对抗行为的覆盖范围和可持续性指标进行评估。结果:几种内容验证和多媒体取证工具对保留的材料表现良好,基础设施级工具提供了有用的指标;这些是有时间限制的描述性观察,而不是一般的排名。确切的案例级复制是有限的,因为包不保留完整的CT-A/CT-B映射、运行级输出、分母或配置。社交媒体分析和机器人检测工具在平台API限制下最不稳定。在多语言处理、互操作性、可解释性和集成到威胁情报格式方面的缺点再次出现。结论:该研究为在FIMI TTP检测的背景下评估OSINT工具提供了一种可转移的方法。结合混合源语料库、结构化测试、从业者验证和可用材料的发布,它提高了方法的透明度,同时澄清了自动化输出和保留复制记录的限制。建议的工具套件是一个分层的决策支持基线,而不是一个生成结论的系统。未来的工作应该扩展多语言和分布外测试,操作偏差和可解释性指标,保存运行级记录,并寻求合法访问平台数据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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