The reverse information paradox: When AI platforms retain too much or too little data

IF 2 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Economics Letters Pub Date : 2026-09-01 Epub Date: 2026-09-04 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113209
Vijaya Bhaskar Marisetty, Varsha Mamidi
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

When do AI platforms retain too much or too little user data? Users disclose proprietary context to obtain useful generative-AI output, but retention of that context creates exposure and may improve future systems. We formalize this user-side analogue of Arrow’s information paradox. The disclosure cap separates two regimes. Outside the capped region, behavioral adjustment is strong enough for equilibrium harm to fall with retention, so the planner’s optimum is a boundary choice. Within the capped region, the ratio of benefit appropriability to harm internalization governs platform retention: the platform under-retains when the ratio is below one and over-retains when it is above one. When retained inputs also raise AI quality, retention and disclosure become complements once quality feedback is sufficiently strong. Retention regulation corrects the platform’s choice; an interior disclosure choice generally requires an additional disclosure-side instrument to implement the joint first best.
逆向信息悖论:当人工智能平台保留太多或太少的数据时
人工智能平台什么时候会保留过多或过少的用户数据?用户披露专有上下文以获得有用的生成人工智能输出,但保留该上下文会产生暴露,并可能改进未来的系统。我们将阿罗信息悖论的用户端类比形式化。披露上限将两种制度分开。在上限区域之外,行为调整的强度足以使平衡伤害随保留率下降,因此规划者的最优选择是一个边界选择。在上限区域内,利益可占有性与伤害内部化的比值决定着平台留存率,当该比值低于1时,平台留存率不足;当该比值高于1时,平台留存率过高。当留存输入也能提高AI质量时,一旦质量反馈足够强大,留存和披露就会成为互补。留存率规则纠正了平台的选择;内部披露的选择通常需要一个额外的披露方工具来实现联合最佳。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Economics Letters
Economics Letters ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.00%
发文量
348
审稿时长
30 days
期刊介绍: Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.
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