{"title":"The reverse information paradox: When AI platforms retain too much or too little data","authors":"Vijaya Bhaskar Marisetty, Varsha Mamidi","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113209","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>When do AI platforms retain too much or too little user data? Users disclose proprietary context to obtain useful generative-AI output, but retention of that context creates exposure and may improve future systems. We formalize this user-side analogue of Arrow’s information paradox. The disclosure cap separates two regimes. Outside the capped region, behavioral adjustment is strong enough for equilibrium harm to fall with retention, so the planner’s optimum is a boundary choice. Within the capped region, the ratio of benefit appropriability to harm internalization governs platform retention: the platform under-retains when the ratio is below one and over-retains when it is above one. When retained inputs also raise AI quality, retention and disclosure become complements once quality feedback is sufficiently strong. Retention regulation corrects the platform’s choice; an interior disclosure choice generally requires an additional disclosure-side instrument to implement the joint first best.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"268 ","pages":"Article 113209"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2026-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics Letters","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176526004052","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/9/4 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
When do AI platforms retain too much or too little user data? Users disclose proprietary context to obtain useful generative-AI output, but retention of that context creates exposure and may improve future systems. We formalize this user-side analogue of Arrow’s information paradox. The disclosure cap separates two regimes. Outside the capped region, behavioral adjustment is strong enough for equilibrium harm to fall with retention, so the planner’s optimum is a boundary choice. Within the capped region, the ratio of benefit appropriability to harm internalization governs platform retention: the platform under-retains when the ratio is below one and over-retains when it is above one. When retained inputs also raise AI quality, retention and disclosure become complements once quality feedback is sufficiently strong. Retention regulation corrects the platform’s choice; an interior disclosure choice generally requires an additional disclosure-side instrument to implement the joint first best.
期刊介绍:
Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.