Redeeming Relative Value: Indexicality and Consequentializing Agent‐Centered Norms

Abstract

Robert Nozick doubted forms of consequentialism that employ so‐called “agent‐relative value” because he found them “gimmicky.” This doubt has been sharpened by Don Regan, Mark Schroeder, and others into the objection that agent‐relative value lacks the practical importance we associate with good simpliciter . This sharpened objection has prompted agent‐relative consequentialists to replace the agent‐relative value at the foundation of their view with agent‐relative reasons for desire. This paper argues for two claims. First, the turn to agent‐relative reasons is less promising than it seems. Second, concerns about gimmickiness can be allayed directly by showing how standard decision‐theoretic conceptions of outcomes already relativize what agents evaluate without relativizing value itself.