The Rational Design of Space Agreements: How Bilateralism Shapes Powerful States' Design Preferences

Abstract

The global governance of outer space relies heavily on international agreements, yet the institutional forms of these agreements remain underexplored. This article introduces a new dataset on various design features of 952 space agreements, offering the first large‐N overview of institutional design in space governance. Building on rational design theory, this article analyzes how these design features interact with one another and with negotiation structures. Our results reveal systematic trade‐offs and suggest that power asymmetry has contrasting effects depending on the context: Powerful states tend to favor greater delegation, precision, and enforcement in bilateral agreements, while often resisting them in multilateral settings. These findings underscore the importance of accounting for both power dynamics and bilateralism, two contextual factors often overlooked in rational design theory. By making the dataset publicly available, the article seeks to foster further research on the causes and consequences of institutional variation in space governance and to advance comparative institutionalist scholarship across issue‐areas of global governance.