Information Design in Common Value Auction With Moral Hazard: Application to OCS Leasing Auctions

IF 6.2 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Econometrica Pub Date : 2026-07-29 DOI:10.3982/ECTA21839
Anh Nguyen
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Abstract

This paper explores the impact of information design on the auctioneer's revenue in the U.S. offshore oil/gas lease auctions where, post-auction, the winner decides whether to explore the auctioned tract and must pay the government a royalty on its production value. I first document that there is a positive correlation between the exploration rate and publicly observed losing bids. This suggests that the winning bidder uses the rivals' bids to infer their private information about the tract's potential. I then characterize the equilibrium bidding strategy when the auctioneer designs and commits to how to reveal information on losing bids to the winning bidder. Counterfactual exercises reveal that alternative bid disclosure policies significantly improve auctioneer revenue.

Abstract Image

考虑道德风险的共值拍卖信息设计:在OCS租赁拍卖中的应用
本文探讨了信息设计对美国海上油气租赁拍卖中拍卖商收入的影响,在拍卖后,中标者决定是否勘探拍卖区域,并必须向政府支付其生产价值的特许权使用费。我首先证明了勘探率与公开观察到的失败投标之间存在正相关关系。这表明,中标者利用竞争对手的出价来推断他们对该地块潜力的私人信息。然后,我描述了均衡竞价策略,即拍卖人设计并承诺如何向中标人披露败标信息。反事实练习表明,替代性竞价披露政策显著提高了拍卖商的收入。
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来源期刊
Econometrica
Econometrica 社会科学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
11.00
自引率
3.30%
发文量
75
审稿时长
6-12 weeks
期刊介绍: Econometrica publishes original articles in all branches of economics - theoretical and empirical, abstract and applied, providing wide-ranging coverage across the subject area. It promotes studies that aim at the unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems and that are penetrated by constructive and rigorous thinking. It explores a unique range of topics each year - from the frontier of theoretical developments in many new and important areas, to research on current and applied economic problems, to methodologically innovative, theoretical and applied studies in econometrics. Econometrica maintains a long tradition that submitted articles are refereed carefully and that detailed and thoughtful referee reports are provided to the author as an aid to scientific research, thus ensuring the high calibre of papers found in Econometrica. An international board of editors, together with the referees it has selected, has succeeded in substantially reducing editorial turnaround time, thereby encouraging submissions of the highest quality. We strongly encourage recent Ph. D. graduates to submit their work to Econometrica. Our policy is to take into account the fact that recent graduates are less experienced in the process of writing and submitting papers.
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