Balancing Act: Coercion, Terrorism, and Regime Stability

Abstract

A substantial literature seeks to understand the drivers and consequences of foreign policy instruments that states employ to change the behavior of other states. We argue that this body of work—and the surrounding policy discourse—often miscategorizes or misunderstands the goals of these instruments in the important set of cases involving the threat of terrorism. We contend that the deployment of these instruments depends on the relationship between the target regime and the coercing state and the degree to which the coercing state perceives a terrorist threat emanating from the target’s territory. We develop a typology that characterizes and predicts foreign policy approaches as a function of these two concerns. We theorize that, in cases where the target regime is adversarial and where a distinct terrorist threat is perceived, the coercer employs a balancing approach. It seeks to apply enough pressure to keep the target regime weak, but not so much that the regime collapses, which could allow extremist non-state actors to assume control. We use in-depth case studies of US foreign policy in Syria and Afghanistan to contest the common narrative that sanctions fail and, instead, contend that maintaining regime limbo often serves US goals and interests as defined in the post-9/11 era.