Udayana on Learning Through Memory

Abstract

In premodern South Asia, philosophers often claimed that memory is not a method of knowledge‐acquisition. But some, especially Jaina epistemologists, dissented from this standard view. They argued that occurrent memories can help us learn novel truths about past objects and experiences. In doing so, these thinkers embraced the possibility that we can acquire self‐locating knowledge , that is, knowledge about ourselves or our temporal location, by means of memory. In this paper, I will focus on a Nyāya philosopher, Udayana (ca. 10th–11th centuries CE), who defended the standard view against this objection. I will reconstruct Udayana's account of memory, and explain how he tries to rule out the possibility of gaining purely self‐locating knowledge by means of memory alone. I will then argue that Udayana's response to the Jaina objection is unsuccessful, and in fact reveals a deeper tension within the Nyāya account of memory.