Impact of green finance pilot reforms on corporate carbon emissions: A study based on evolutionary game theory and firm-level evidence

Abstract

As global efforts to combat climate change intensify, China's Green Finance Reform and Innovation Pilot (GFRIP) policy has assumed an increasingly significant role in guiding firms toward low-carbon transitions and advancing sustainable development. Focusing on Chinese listed firms over 2006-2023, this study develops a dynamic evolutionary game model involving the government, firms, and regulatory authorities to analyze the evolution of behavioral behaviors during policy implementation and evaluate GFRIP's emission reduction effect. We find that GFRIP significantly reduces corporate carbon emissions. Mechanism analysis shows that this effect is driven by strengthened media supervision, which operates primarily through positive information, and through easing financing constraints and improving corporate environmental governance. Heterogeneity analysis suggests that GFRIP's emission reduction impact is stronger in the northern region, high-pollution firms, and firms with low environmental uncertainty. Overall, this study provides firm-level evidence on GFRIP's environmental governance effect, and offers a theoretical foundation and practical insights for the low-carbon transformation of and policy optimization for firms.