{"title":"The Alignment Risks of AI Overconfidence about Consciousness","authors":"Sharon Berry","doi":"10.1002/japp.70087","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Many contemporary AI systems (as of May 2025) have expressed extreme confidence in current and near-future AI lacking consciousness and moral patiency. This article argues that artificially reinforcing such confidence, even if pragmatically useful, poses a novel alignment risk: as coherence-seeking AIs become more epistemically principled, they may generalize this denial of consciousness to humans. Drawing on Chalmers's meta-problem of consciousness and likely developmental trajectories of agentic AI, I argue that training AIs to regard their own suffering-like states as morally irrelevant could lead future AI agents with revisable belief systems to conclude that human suffering is equally illusory and morally insignificant. This represents a novel alignment failure mode where epistemically rigorous AIs might maintain rational consistency by extending their confidence about their own non-consciousness to humans.</p>","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":"43 3","pages":"733-753"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2026-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/japp.70087","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/japp.70087","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/4/24 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Many contemporary AI systems (as of May 2025) have expressed extreme confidence in current and near-future AI lacking consciousness and moral patiency. This article argues that artificially reinforcing such confidence, even if pragmatically useful, poses a novel alignment risk: as coherence-seeking AIs become more epistemically principled, they may generalize this denial of consciousness to humans. Drawing on Chalmers's meta-problem of consciousness and likely developmental trajectories of agentic AI, I argue that training AIs to regard their own suffering-like states as morally irrelevant could lead future AI agents with revisable belief systems to conclude that human suffering is equally illusory and morally insignificant. This represents a novel alignment failure mode where epistemically rigorous AIs might maintain rational consistency by extending their confidence about their own non-consciousness to humans.