Carbon-Aware Multi-Level Local Energy Market for Electricity-Hydrogen Trading Based on Distributionally Robust Game Framework

IF 6.2 1区 工程技术 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC
Longyan Li;Abdulelah S. Alshehri;Maher M. Alrashed;Chao Ning
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The proliferation of distribution-level green electricity and hydrogen resources entails an efficient local energy market (LEM). However, the existing LEM designed for electricity-hydrogen trading falls short of modeling multi-level mechanisms and accounting for the carbon intensity of hydrogen production. To bridge this gap, we propose a carbon-aware multilevel LEM for electricity-hydrogen trading based on a distributionally robust game framework, where hydrogen-based microgrids (HMGs) supply hydrogen to heterogeneous hydrogen users (HUs) including hydrogen refueling stations and industrial users. In this game framework, the coordination between HMGs and HUs is cast as a multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game. Specifically, HMGs determine an integrated hydrogen-carbon price, and carry out electricity trading through a non-cooperative game. Meanwhile, HUs act as followers, adjusting hydrogen purchasing strategies. Furthermore, the self-dispatching of HMGs and HUs is modeled as distributionally robust optimization problems considering source-load and hydrogen demand uncertainties, respectively. To hedge against these uncertainties, a novel Bayesian nonparametric hybrid ambiguity set is constructed based on local Wasserstein balls and moment information. Finally, the equilibrium of the proposed game framework is theoretically proved, and a distributed algorithm is developed to obtain this equilibrium. Comparative studies validate that the proposed game framework outperforms the existing ones, demonstrating a total income increasement of 12.3% and a carbon emission reduction of 11.6%.
基于分布式鲁棒博弈框架的电力-氢交易碳敏感多级局部能源市场
配电级绿色电力和氢资源的扩散需要一个有效的本地能源市场(LEM)。然而,现有的为电氢交易设计的LEM缺乏对多层次机制的建模和对制氢碳强度的考虑。为了弥补这一差距,我们提出了一个基于分布式鲁棒游戏框架的碳感知多级电力氢交易LEM,其中氢基微电网(hmg)向包括加氢站和工业用户在内的异构氢用户(hu)供应氢。在这个博弈框架中,hmg和hu之间的协调是一个多领导多追随者的Stackelberg博弈。具体而言,hmg通过非合作博弈确定氢碳综合价格,并进行电力交易。同时,HUs作为追随者,调整氢的购买策略。在此基础上,分别建立了考虑源负荷和氢需求不确定性的分布式鲁棒优化问题模型。为了对冲这些不确定性,基于局部Wasserstein球和矩信息构造了一种新的贝叶斯非参数混合模糊集。最后,从理论上证明了所提出的博弈框架的均衡性,并开发了一种分布式算法来获得这种均衡性。对比研究表明,本文提出的博弈框架优于现有的博弈框架,总收入增长12.3%,碳排放减少11.6%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy
Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC-
CiteScore
12.30
自引率
14.30%
发文量
97
审稿时长
13 weeks
期刊介绍: Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy (MPCE), commencing from June, 2013, is a newly established, peer-reviewed and quarterly published journal in English. It is the first international power engineering journal originated in mainland China. MPCE publishes original papers, short letters and review articles in the field of modern power systems with focus on smart grid technology and renewable energy integration, etc.
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