Kierkegaard on the Reasons for Neighborly Love

Abstract

Some Kierkegaard scholars view him as endorsing a bestowal account of neighborly love. In this view, love is not grounded in the lovability of the neighbor but freely bestows value on the neighbor. Others interpret him as endorsing a qualities-responsive view, in which love is a response to the neighbor's intrinsic value. I argue both readings miss a distinction Kierkegaard makes between the normative justification for love and its motivation. I suggest Kierkegaard held that love was normatively justified by the intrinsic value of being human, but not motivated by perception of this value. This is because Kierkegaard held to a “principle of engaged observation,” i.e., that the perceiver always perceives others in light of her love or lack of love for them. In his view, only sincere love for the neighbor allows a person to perceive her value. Thus, Christian love cannot be motivated by perception of the neighbor's value. The motivation for love, for Kierkegaard, is an inchoate urge to love that is constitutive of being human. This urge is typically obstructed by false concepts of love, but can be directed toward the neighbor by adopting the mere belief that every human being is worthy of love.