Knowledge Is Power: The Importance of Public Accounting Experience for Mutual Fund Managers' Monitoring La connaissance est source de pouvoir : l'importance de l'expérience en comptabilité publique pour le contrôle des gestionnaires de fond commun de placement

IF 4.9 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2026-06-08 Epub Date: 2026-02-06 DOI:10.1111/1911-3846.70032
Yangyang Chen, Jun Huang, Ting Li, Jeffrey Pittman
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We document that firms held by mutual fund managers who have public accounting experience earlier in their careers exhibit higher-quality financial reporting, as evidenced by a lower likelihood of financial statement restatements. Additional evidence shows that fund managers with public accounting experience are more likely to conduct site visits to their portfolio firms and discuss accounting policy–related topics during those visits. Moreover, the restatement likelihood falls after fund managers' site visits, particularly when they raise accounting policy–related issues during their visits. In cross-sectional results consistent with expectations, we find that the role that fund manager public accounting experience plays is amplified when the firm suffers more severe agency problems, firm information asymmetry is worse, fund managers are more risk averse, fund managers have prior work experience at larger accounting firms, fund managers hold a larger proportion of the firm's shares, or there is coordination among mutual funds. Collectively, our evidence suggests that fund managers with public accounting experience impose stricter external monitoring on their portfolio firms' financial reporting choices.

知识就是力量:公共会计经验对共同基金经理监督的重要性
我们发现,在职业生涯早期拥有公共会计经验的共同基金经理所持有的公司表现出更高质量的财务报告,财务报表重述的可能性较低。其他证据表明,具有公共会计经验的基金经理更有可能对其投资组合公司进行实地考察,并在这些考察中讨论与会计政策相关的主题。此外,在基金经理实地考察后,特别是当他们在实地考察期间提出与会计政策相关的问题时,重述的可能性下降。在与预期一致的横截面结果中,我们发现当公司代理问题越严重、公司信息不对称越严重、基金经理风险厌恶程度越高、基金经理在较大的会计师事务所工作过、基金经理持有公司股份比例较大或共同基金之间存在协调关系时,基金经理公开会计经验的作用被放大。总的来说,我们的证据表明,具有公共会计经验的基金经理对其投资组合公司的财务报告选择实施了更严格的外部监督。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.20
自引率
11.10%
发文量
97
期刊介绍: Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR) is the premiere research journal of the Canadian Academic Accounting Association, which publishes leading- edge research that contributes to our understanding of all aspects of accounting"s role within organizations, markets or society. Canadian based, increasingly global in scope, CAR seeks to reflect the geographical and intellectual diversity in accounting research. To accomplish this, CAR will continue to publish in its traditional areas of excellence, while seeking to more fully represent other research streams in its pages, so as to continue and expand its tradition of excellence.
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