The effort-maximizing move order in tullock contests

IF 1.1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-05-20 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.005
Lei Gao , Jingfeng Lu , Zhewei Wang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper examines effort-maximizing move orders in two-player Tullock contests across varying levels of contest accuracy and player asymmetries. Unlike prior work that favors strong-lead sequential formats in lottery contests, our analysis demonstrates that all three formats—strong-lead, weak-lead, and simultaneous—can be optimal in the general Tullock contests. Strong-lead contests are most effective in noisy environments, but lose their advantage as contest accuracy increases. Weak-lead contests may become optimal when the weaker player successfully preempts. Simultaneous-move contests tend to perform better as the players’ ability differences become less severe. Overall, the optimal contest design jointly depends on the contest accuracy levels and relative strengths of the contestants.
塔洛克竞赛中努力最大化的移动顺序
本文研究了在不同水平的比赛精度和球员不对称的情况下,两名球员图洛克比赛中努力最大化的移动顺序。与先前的研究不同,我们的分析表明,在一般的Tullock竞赛中,所有三种形式——强领先、弱领先和同时领先——都是最优的。强领先的比赛在嘈杂的环境中最有效,但随着比赛准确性的提高,优势就会消失。当较弱的玩家成功抢占时,弱领先的比赛可能会变得最优。当玩家的能力差异变得不那么严重时,同时移动比赛往往表现得更好。总的来说,最优的比赛设计取决于比赛的准确率水平和选手的相对优势。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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