{"title":"The effort-maximizing move order in tullock contests","authors":"Lei Gao , Jingfeng Lu , Zhewei Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.05.005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines effort-maximizing move orders in two-player Tullock contests across varying levels of contest accuracy and player asymmetries. Unlike prior work that favors strong-lead sequential formats in lottery contests, our analysis demonstrates that all three formats—strong-lead, weak-lead, and simultaneous—can be optimal in the general Tullock contests. Strong-lead contests are most effective in noisy environments, but lose their advantage as contest accuracy increases. Weak-lead contests may become optimal when the weaker player successfully preempts. Simultaneous-move contests tend to perform better as the players’ ability differences become less severe. Overall, the optimal contest design jointly depends on the contest accuracy levels and relative strengths of the contestants.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"158 ","pages":"Pages 622-629"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2026-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games and Economic Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825626000837","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/5/20 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper examines effort-maximizing move orders in two-player Tullock contests across varying levels of contest accuracy and player asymmetries. Unlike prior work that favors strong-lead sequential formats in lottery contests, our analysis demonstrates that all three formats—strong-lead, weak-lead, and simultaneous—can be optimal in the general Tullock contests. Strong-lead contests are most effective in noisy environments, but lose their advantage as contest accuracy increases. Weak-lead contests may become optimal when the weaker player successfully preempts. Simultaneous-move contests tend to perform better as the players’ ability differences become less severe. Overall, the optimal contest design jointly depends on the contest accuracy levels and relative strengths of the contestants.
期刊介绍:
Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology