{"title":"Tax Buyouts in Oligopoly","authors":"Giorgos Stamatopoulos","doi":"10.1111/jpet.70116","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n <p>We analyze a novel tax mechanism in imperfectly competitive product markets. The government announces a per unit (or excise) tax rate and auctions-off a number of tax exemptions. Namely, it invites the firms in the market to acquire the right to be exempted from the per unit tax. The highest bidders are exempted by paying their bids; and all other firms remain subject to it. The mechanism has a number of desirable features. First, it allows the government to collect more revenues than the standard tax policies. Further it reduces distortions as fewer firms pay the per unit tax. The mechanism reduces also the excess entry of firms that often occurs in oligopolistic markets. It creates no discrimination as <i>all</i> firms end up having the same net payoff, and it is voluntary as the firms choose whether to participate in the auction or not (and hence choose how to be taxed). Our mechanism can be seen as the product-market analog of the income tax buyout fiscal mechanism (Del Negro et al. 2010).</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":47024,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","volume":"28 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2026-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Public Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jpet.70116","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We analyze a novel tax mechanism in imperfectly competitive product markets. The government announces a per unit (or excise) tax rate and auctions-off a number of tax exemptions. Namely, it invites the firms in the market to acquire the right to be exempted from the per unit tax. The highest bidders are exempted by paying their bids; and all other firms remain subject to it. The mechanism has a number of desirable features. First, it allows the government to collect more revenues than the standard tax policies. Further it reduces distortions as fewer firms pay the per unit tax. The mechanism reduces also the excess entry of firms that often occurs in oligopolistic markets. It creates no discrimination as all firms end up having the same net payoff, and it is voluntary as the firms choose whether to participate in the auction or not (and hence choose how to be taxed). Our mechanism can be seen as the product-market analog of the income tax buyout fiscal mechanism (Del Negro et al. 2010).
本文分析了不完全竞争产品市场中的一种新的税收机制。政府公布了单位（或消费税）税率，并拍卖了一些免税项目。也就是说，它邀请市场上的企业获得免征单位税的权利。出价最高的竞买人缴纳其标的款后可获豁免；所有其他公司都要遵守。这种机制有许多令人满意的特点。首先，它允许政府比标准税收政策征收更多的收入。此外，由于支付单位税的企业越来越少，这也减少了扭曲。该机制还减少了在寡头垄断市场中经常出现的企业过度进入。它不会造成任何歧视，因为所有公司最终都有相同的净收益，而且它是自愿的，因为公司选择是否参与拍卖（从而选择如何征税）。我们的机制可以看作是所得税买断财政机制的产品市场模拟（Del Negro et al. 2010）。
期刊介绍：
As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.
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