Marc Bourreau, Adrien Raizonville, Guillaume Thébaudin
{"title":"Interoperability Between Ad-Financed Platforms With Endogenous Multi-Homing","authors":"Marc Bourreau, Adrien Raizonville, Guillaume Thébaudin","doi":"10.1111/joie.70018","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n <p>Platform interoperability is considered a powerful tool to promote competition in digital markets when network effects are at play. We study the incentives of two competing ad-funded platforms to provide interoperability in a setting where consumers can single-home or multi-home and decide how much time to spend online. When the platforms are symmetric, perfect interoperability emerges in equilibrium and is socially efficient. When a larger platform has an installed base of customers, its incentive to make its services interoperable is lower than for the smaller platform. Interoperability does not emerge in equilibrium if the installed base is sufficiently large. However, mandating interoperability between the asymmetric platforms is not always socially optimal.</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"74 2","pages":"197-215"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2026-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Industrial Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joie.70018","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/1/27 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Platform interoperability is considered a powerful tool to promote competition in digital markets when network effects are at play. We study the incentives of two competing ad-funded platforms to provide interoperability in a setting where consumers can single-home or multi-home and decide how much time to spend online. When the platforms are symmetric, perfect interoperability emerges in equilibrium and is socially efficient. When a larger platform has an installed base of customers, its incentive to make its services interoperable is lower than for the smaller platform. Interoperability does not emerge in equilibrium if the installed base is sufficiently large. However, mandating interoperability between the asymmetric platforms is not always socially optimal.
期刊介绍：
First published in 1952, the Journal of Industrial Economics has a wide international circulation and is recognised as a leading journal in the field. It was founded to promote the analysis of modern industry, particularly the behaviour of firms and the functioning of markets. Contributions are welcomed in all areas of industrial economics including: - organization of industry - applied oligopoly theory - product differentiation and technical change - theory of the firm and internal organization - regulation - monopoly - merger and technology policy Necessarily, these subjects will often draw on adjacent areas such as international economics, labour economics and law.
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