Mano dura: An experimental evaluation of military policing in Cali, Colombia

Abstract

Governments across the Global South rely on their militaries for domestic policing operations. We experimentally evaluate the social and political consequences of a military policing intervention in Cali, Colombia, one of the world's most violent cities. The intervention, Plan Fortaleza, involved recurring, intensive military patrols randomized at the city block level. Our evaluation combines administrative crime and human rights data, surveys of more than 10,000 residents, a conjoint experiment, a “costly” behavioral measure, and qualitative interviews with 49 civil society leaders. Despite null or adverse effects on crime and human rights, we show that Plan Fortaleza improved citizen’ attitudes toward the military and increased their demand for military involvement in domestic law enforcement. It also strengthened citizens’ support for extrajudicial punishment and—alarmingly—for military coups in response to rising crime, potentially signaling a diminished commitment to democracy and the rule of law among the program's intended beneficiaries.